This paper investigates the claim that giving voters multiple votes to cast would result in more moderate policies as compared to when voters have only one vote to cast. This claim is based on the argument that when voters have only one vote to cast, centrist candidates are squeezed between the left and right candidates who capture all the leftist and rightist votes. It has then been argued that giving every voter multiple votes to cast would 'unsqueeze' the centrist candidates, which would improve the electoral prospects of the centrist candidates and result in more moderate policies as compared to when voters have only one vote to cast. The present paper shows that this need not be true when candidacy is endogenous: Giving voters multiple votes to cast can then actually result in more extreme policies as compared to when voters have only one vote to cast! This happens because of two features that characterize many of the electoral rules that give voters multiple votes to cast: (1) the inability to deter spoiling and multiple similar candidacies; and (2) the multiplicity of admissible voting pro…les, which helps support selfful…lling prophecies that deter entries in and defections from the race. Coombs Voting, an instant-runo¤ electoral rule, is shown to exhibit neither of these two features and to always result in the adoption of the most moderate policies. Approval Voting is also shown to always implement moderate policies but only after some restrictions are imposed on the voting and candidacy behaviors. Whether these restrictions would actually be satis…ed if elections were held under Approval Voting is an empirical question.
INTRODUCTION
There are many ways in which electoral rules can a¤ect economic policies and welfare. In a representative democracy, one such way is through the incentives that electoral rules provide for candidates to stand for election. Since di¤erent electoral rules provide di¤erent incentives for candidate entry, who is elected and, therefore, which policy is implemented can vary from one electoral rule to another. The present paper looks at the e¤ect of those incentives on policy moderation. Policy moderation is here de…ned as the adoption of policies that lie closer to the median citizen's ideal policy. Policy moderation can reduce the magnitude of policy ‡uc-tuations from one government to the next and can therefore be welfare-enhancing if (excessive) variations in economic policies are harmful for the community.
Several countries, such as the U.S. and Canada, elect their policy-makers by means of Plurality Voting. Plurality Voting is the electoral rule in which every citizen is given one indivisible vote to cast and the election winner is the candidate who receives the most votes. Some people-several scholars included-have argued that, as compared to Plurality Voting, centrist candidates would be favored by electoral rules that give citizens multiple votes to cast. This was most clearly stated in the case of Approval Voting 1 : "Advocates of approval voting have argued that centrist candidates are favored in multicandidate elections held under approval voting, whereas extremist candidates are sometimes favored under the plurality rule." (Cox 1985 ; 112) It has been argued that these electoral rules would thus improve the electoral prospects of the centrist candidates and yield policy moderation compared to Plurality Voting. Two arguments have been put forward to justify this claim.
One argument assumes that voting is strategic. This argument relies on the elimination of the wasting-the-vote e¤ ect of Plurality Voting. More speci…cally, when the election is held under Plurality Voting, a citizen whose most-preferred candidate has no chance of winning the election would be wasting her only vote by casting it for this candidate. Such a citizen would thus have an incentive to vote for a candidate that she might like less but whose electoral prospects are better. This is the so-called wasting-the-vote e¤ect of Plurality Voting. This e¤ect has an important implication: It induces voters to strategically desert the candidates whom they believe to be sure losers, thereby con…rming the underdog status of those candidates. Given that centrist candidates (as other candidates) can fall victim to such self-ful…lling prophecies, they need not get elected under Plurality Voting, even if they are preferred by a majority of the electorate. By contrast, the wasting-thevote e¤ect and the self-ful…lling prophecies that accompany it would be weakened, if not eliminated, if voters were given multiple votes to cast. Indeed, voters would then be less reluctant to vote for a candidate, even if this candidate is believed to be an underdog. The centrist candidates would arguably be the main bene…ciaries of such an electoral reform since they would be considered as acceptable policymakers by a large fraction of the electorate and would therefore receive a large number of votes. This, the argument goes, would improve the electoral prospects of the centrist candidates and result in more moderate policies as compared to Plurality Voting.
The second argument assumes instead that voting is sincere. This argument relies on the elimination of the squeezing e¤ ect of Plurality Voting. More specifically, when the election is held under Plurality Voting and voters vote sincerely (i.e., vote for their most-preferred candidate), all the leftist and rightist votes go to the left and right candidates, thereby leaving the centrist candidates with the sole centrist votes. Except if the left and right candidates'positions are overly polarized, the centrist candidates have thus no chance of garnering enough votes to win the election. In other words, the centrist candidates are squeezed between the left and right candidates. This is the so-called squeezing e¤ect of Plurality Voting. By contrast, the squeezing e¤ect would be weakened, if not eliminated, if voters were given 'su¢ ciently'many votes to cast. Indeed, some leftist and rightist votes would then 1 Approval Voting is the electoral rule in which a citizen can vote for as many candidates as she wishes. The election winner is the candidate who receives the most votes. Approval Voting has been popularized by Fishburn (1978, 1983) and is currently used by several professional and academic associations to elect their o¢ cers. For more details on Approval Voting see, for example, Brams (2007) . reach the centrist candidates. This would improve the electoral prospects of the centrist candidates and result in more moderate policies as compared to Plurality Voting.
The present work revisits the latter argument-i.e., the argument based on the elimination of the squeezing e¤ect-in a setting where candidacy is endogenous and candidates are policy-motivated. 2 For this purpose, political competition is modelled following the citizen-candidate approach. Under this approach, a community must elect a representative to select and implement a policy such as a tax rate or the location of a public facility (e.g., a public library or a …re station). The policy-making process has three stages. At the …rst stage, each potential candidate decides whether or not to stand for election. Standing for election entails a sunk cost. At the second stage, an election is held to select one candidate to become the policy-maker. At the third stage, the elected policy-maker chooses and implements policy. A central premise of the citizen-candidate approach is the inability on the part of the candidates to credibly commit to their campaign promises.
Endogenizing candidacy is justi…ed both theoretically and empirically. On the theoretical side, Dutta et al. (2001) establish that any non-dictatorial electoral rule (that satis…es a mild unanimity axiom) is subject to strategic candidacy, i.e., allows candidates, even losing candidates, to a¤ect the election outcome by entering in or defecting from the race. On the empirical side, world elections provide ample evidence that di¤erent electoral rules provide di¤erent incentives for candidates to stand for election (see, for example, Gallagher and Mitchell 2005) . Taking candidates'policy-motivation into account is likewise theoretically and empirically justi…ed. For example, on the theoretical side, the extent of polarization in two-candidate elections depends on whether candidates are policy-motivated and whether they can therefore credibly commit to their campaign promises (Alesina 1988 ). On the empirical side, evidence suggests that policy-makers' own policy preferences are decisive for their policy decisions (Levitt 1996 , Lee et al. 2004) .
The variety of possible electoral rules is truly staggering. The focus in this paper is on two of the most commonly-studied classes of electoral rules. One class, the Multiple Voting rules, consists of those electoral rules in which each citizen is given q votes to cast for the di¤erent candidates, where q varies with the Multiple Voting rule. The election winner is the candidate who receives the most votes. Examples of Multiple Voting rules are Dual Voting and Approval Voting. 3 The second class, the Ordinal Voting rules, consists of those electoral rules in which each voter must rank-order the candidates. Examples of Ordinal Voting rules are the Borda Count, the Single Transferable Vote and Coombs Voting. 4 In order to concentrate on the 2 Dellis (2009) adopts a similar framework and revisits the former argument, i.e., the argument based on the elimination of the wasting-the-vote e¤ect. As we shall see below, when candidacy is endogenous the two arguments yield very di¤erent, sometimes opposite, conclusions. 3 Dual Voting is the Multiple Voting rule in which every citizen is given two one-point votes to cast for the di¤erent candidates, i.e., q = 2. 4 Under the Borda Count, a voter must rank-order the candidates, giving c r points to the candidate she ranks r th on the ballot, where c is the number of candidates. The election winner is the candidate who receives the most points. The Borda Count is regularly used in small committees.
The Single Transferable Vote is an instant-runo¤ electoral rule. Under this electoral rule, a voter must rank-order the candidates. If a candidate is ranked …rst by a majority of voters, he is then elected. Otherwise, the candidate who is ranked …rst by the smallest number of voters is eliminated and, on every voter's ballot, all the candidates ranked below the eliminated candidate are moved up by one rank. This process is repeated until a candidate is ranked …rst by a majority of voters. The Single Transferable Vote is currently used for political elections in Australia and in number of votes, attention is here restricted to single-ballot single-winner elections.
A Multiple Voting rule is shown to always yield policy moderation compared to Plurality Voting if: (1) the Multiple Voting rule is Approval Voting; (2) attention is restricted to serious equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which every candidate is elected with a strictly positive probability; and (3) voting is restricted to be relatively sincere, i.e., voters vote for as many of the candidates they prefer to the winning lottery as they can. However, it is also shown that if any of these three conditions is not satis…ed, then communities exist in which policy outcomes can be more extreme as compared to when the election is held under Plurality Voting. I argue that this happens because of three things. First, Multiple Voting rules that admit only completely-…lled ballots (i.e., that force voters to cast all their votes) induce multiple entries at the same positions. These multiple similar candidacies trigger a dilution e¤ect, whereby the votes received by a centrist candidate get diluted in a greater mass of votes. This dilution e¤ect results in a strengthening of the squeezing e¤ect. Second, Multiple Voting rules that admit truncated ballots (i.e., in which voters are free to cast as many of their votes as they wish) give rise to a (possibly large) multiplicity of permissible voting pro…les, which triggers an expansion of the equilibrium set. Finally, the presence of spoiler candidates (i.e., candidates who, in equilibrium, are elected with probability zero) helps support self-ful…lling prophecies and renders the elimination of the squeezing e¤ect irrelevant.
The extent of policy moderation is shown to always be maximal under two Ordinal Voting rules, namely, Coombs Voting and the Borda Count (the latter under the restriction that all equilibria are serious). In the case of Coombs Voting, this happens because it always elects the Condorcet winner (i.e., the candidate who defeats any other candidate in a pairwise contest) and is therefore able to eliminate the squeezing e¤ect and deter spoiler candidates from entering the race. In the case of the Borda Count, this happens because of an inverse squeezing e¤ect-whereby the vote share of a centrist candidate increases when an extremist enters the race.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents the model. Sections 4 and 5 study polarization in Multiple Voting and Ordinal Voting elections. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
RELATED LITERATURE
The present work is related to a number of papers that study polarization in the Downsian framework. In the prototypical Downsian model, two candidates compete for o¢ ce by choosing a platform along the line. Both candidates care only about winning the election and can commit to carry out their platform in case they are elected. Voters' preferences over policies are single-peaked. In this context, both candidates are shown to adopt the platform preferred by the median voter. This is the so-called median voter theorem. Subsequent contributions have shown that the median voter theorem is not robust to relaxing the di¤erent assumptions underlying the Downsian model. 5 a number of U.S. cities (e.g., San Francisco). Some advocacy groups (e.g., the Center for Voting and Democracy) have been promoting the use of the Single Transferable Vote for U.S. elections.
Coombs Voting is a variant of the Single Transferable Vote in which the candidate who is eliminated is the one who is ranked last by the largest number of voters (instead of the candidate who is ranked …rst by the smallest number of voters). 5 For example, candidates are shown to choose polarized platforms if: (1) candidates care about the policy that will be implemented and are uncertain about the distribution of preferences in More closely related to the present paper are those contributions that, within the Downsian framework, study polarization in multi-candidate elections under alternative voting procedures. Cox (1987 and 1990 ) assume the voting behavior to be sincere and restrict attention to convergent equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which all candidates adopt the same platform. No convergent equilibrium is shown to exist when the election is held under Plurality Voting (hereafter PV). Cox then shows that increasing the number of votes each voter casts triggers centripetal forces. In particular, he …nds that both Approval Voting and the Borda Count support a unique convergent equilibrium in which all candidates stand at the median voter's ideal policy. In contrast to Cox, Myerson and Weber (1993) assume the voting behavior to be strategic. In this context, they show that PV puts few restrictions on the location of the serious contenders. This is because of the wasting-the-vote e¤ect. By contrast, in any Approval Voting equilibrium all serious contenders are shown to be standing at the median voter's ideal policy. The present paper focuses on the squeezing e¤ect and shows that the above results must be quali…ed when one takes candidacy decisions into account. 6 The present paper is also related to the citizen-candidate literature that was initiated by Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) . In contrast to the canonical Downsian model, the citizen-candidate approach to political competition assumes candidacy to be endogenous and candidates to care about the policy that will be implemented. The latter implies that candidates are unable to pre-commit to the policy they will implement if elected. In this context, equilibria are shown to exist where in PV elections two candidates enter the race and are standing on polarized platforms. Several works in this literature have compared policy outcomes under alternative voting procedures. Osborne and Slivinski (1996) assume the voting behavior to be sincere. They show that in equilibrium, candidates'positions are less polarized when the election is held under Plurality Runo¤ than under PV. Dellis (2009) assumes the voting behavior to be strategic. He identi…es conditions under which letting people vote for multiple candidates would lessen polarization compared to PV. His focus is on the wasting-the-vote e¤ect. By contrast, the present paper focuses on the squeezing e¤ect and compares the extent of polarization under di¤erent voting procedures. 7 3. MODEL I consider a community that must elect a representative to choose and implement a policy. The set of policy alternatives X is a non-empty interval on R, with typical the electorate (Wittman 1983 , Calvert 1985 , Roemer 1997 ; (2) candidates are policy-motivated and are unable to pre-commit to the policy they will implement if elected (Alesina 1988 ); (3) one of the candidates is an incumbent (Bernhardt and Ingberman 1985) ; (4) policymaking is divided (Ortuno-Ortin 1997, Alesina and Rosenthal 2000); (5) special interest groups provide candidates with campaign contributions (Baron 1994 ); or (6) the two candidates compete under the threat of entry by a third candidate (Palfrey 1984 , Weber 1992 and 1998 , Callander 2005 . For a review of this literature see, for example, Grofman (2004) . 6 It is worth mentioning that several contributions have endogenized candidacy within the Downsian framework (e.g., Feddersen et al. 1990 , Osborne 1993 , Sengupta and Sengupta 2008 . By contrast, the present paper endogenizes candidacy within the citizen-candidate framework and considers alternative voting procedures. 7 While most of the works in the citizen-candidate literature are focused on PV elections, several contributions have studied other voting procedures. Examples are Hamlin and Hjortlund (2000) and Morelli (2004) Let N be the set of citizens, with typical element`. In order to be consistent with sincere voting, I shall assume that there is a continuum of citizens. Without loss of generality I normalize the total mass of citizens to unity. Every citizen`has a (unique) ideal policy x`in X and obtains utility u`(x) = u (jx x`j) when policy x 2 X is implemented. 9 I normalize u`(x`) = 0 and assume that u (:) is (weakly) concave. Citizens'ideal policies are distributed over the set of policy alternatives X according to some strictly increasing and continuous c.d.f. F (:). To simplify the analysis, I shall further assume that the density of F (:) is symmetric about the median citizen's ideal policy m.
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Let P N be the non-empty, …nite set of potential candidates, with typical element i. Potential candidates are those citizens who must decide whether or not to stand for election. The distribution of the potential candidates' ideal policies has support that 'approximates' the support of the distribution of the citizens' ideal policies in the sense that for some small " > 0, any interval on X with length " contains one potential candidates'ideal policy. Also, in order to avoid the complications inherent to corner solutions, I shall assume that there are 'su¢ ciently' many potential candidates who share the same ideal policy. 11 Following the citizen-candidate approach to electoral competition, I model the policy-making process as a three stage game. At the …rst stage, each potential candidate decides whether to stand for election. A potential candidate who chooses to enter the race incurs a utility cost > 0. Candidacy decisions are made simultaneously and non-cooperatively. Candidates are unable to commit to the policy they will implement if elected. 12 At the second stage, an election is held to select the policy-maker among the self-declared candidates. At the third stage, the elected policy-maker chooses and implements policy. In case no one runs for o¢ ce, the status-quo policy x 0 2 X is kept in place. I now analyze each of these stages in a 8 The assumption of a unidimensional policy space is made to facilitate comparison with previous works. Besides, some scholars (e.g., Cox 1990 ) have argued that the assumption of a unidimensional policy space need not be restrictive given the empirical evidence that voters'preferences tend to be strongly correlated over the di¤erent issues (e.g., Hinich and Munger 1994, Bowler et al. 2009 ). 9 Notice that the function u (:) is common to all citizens and, therefore, that citizens di¤er only in their ideal policies. This assumption is made to rule out situations where one leftist prefers a right candidate to a left candidate, whereas one rightist prefers the same left candidate to the same right candidate. Many of the results below would remain unaltered if this assumption was replaced with the weaker assumption of single-crossing preferences. Notice also that preferences are assumed to be symmetric. This assumption is standard in the voting literature. It is made here to simplify the analysis. Indeed, allowing for asymmetric preferences would leave unaltered our two main conclusions, namely, Corollary 1 and Corollary 2.
1 0 This assumption is made to eliminate situations where there are candidates standing at exactly two positions, x L and x R , that are symmetric about the median m and where a citizen`with ideal policy x`2 (x L ; m) ((m; x R ), resp.) chooses to enter the race not to be elected but because she would capture more votes from the candidate standing at x R (x L , resp.) than from the candidate standing at x L (x R , resp.), thereby triggering the outright election of the candidate at x L (x R , resp.). This would signi…cantly complicate the analysis by creating 'holes' in the set of equilibrium outcomes. This complication need not bring new insights for the comparison of alternative electoral rules. 1 1 Relaxing this assumption would complicate the analysis without adding any new insight. 1 2 Incidentally, it is interesting to note that the conclusions that are drawn from the analysis need not depend on this assumption. For example, I have been able to establish that when F (:) is uniform on X and u`(x) = jx x`j for every citizen`2 N and every policy x 2 X, the Multiple Voting rules that admit only completely-…lled ballots would still result in more extreme policies as compared to Plurality Voting. (The formal proof of this result is available from the author.) reverse order.
Policy selection stage. Given that it is the last stage of the game and that candidates cannot pre-commit to a policy, the elected candidate chooses to implement his ideal policy.
Election stage. Let the election be held under a voting procedure V . For a given non-empty set of candidates C, let A V (C) denote the set of admissible voting strategies under V . Also, let `( C) 2 A V (C) be citizen`'s voting strategy. To unify notation across all voting procedures, I shall interpret a voting decision as a ranking of candidates. 13 Let r (C) be the set of candidates who are ranked with a (equal) positive probability at the r th position in `( C). The pro…le of all voting strategies is given by (C).
Voting is sincere. This assumption is made to capture the squeezing e¤ect. Following Brams (1994) , I shall say that a voter votes sincerely if her ballot truthfully re ‡ects her preferences for the di¤erent candidates. Formally, Definition 1 (Sincere voting). Given a non-empty set of candidates C, a citizen`is said to vote sincerely if for all pairs of candidates i and j in C, 1. i 2 r (C) and u`(x j ) > u`(x i ) imply j 2 s (C) for some s < r and j = 2 t (C) for all t r; and 2. i 2 r (C) and u`(
Condition (1) requires that whenever citizen`votes for candidate i, she also votes for all candidate j she strictly prefers to candidate i and ranks all these candidates above candidate i. Condition (2) requires that citizen`treats in the same way any two candidates between whom she is indi¤erent.
14 Throughout the analysis, I shall impose that voting strategies are weakly undominated. This re…nement of the voting behavior is standard in the voting literature.
Candidacy stage. Potential candidates decide simultaneously whether to stand for election at a utility cost > 0. I assume that all potential candidates anticipate the same voting function (:) when making their candidacy decision. I denote citizen`'s candidacy decision by e`2 f0; 1g, where e`= 1 if citizen`chooses to stand for election and e`= 0 otherwise. Let e be the candidacy pro…le and de…ne C (e) f`: e`= 1g as the set of candidates. I shall sometimes write e (e`; e `) , where e `i s the candidacy pro…le of all potential candidates other than`. Letting p i (e; ) denote the probability that i is elected, citizen`'s expected utility is given by U`(e; ) =
if C (e) = ;:
We are now ready to de…ne a candidacy equilibrium.
15 1 3 For example, under PV each voter ranks one candidate only, and the ranked candidate receives one vote. Under Approval Voting, each voter ranks as many candidates as she wishes, and each ranked candidate receives one vote. Under the Borda Count, each voter ranks the di¤erent candidates and the candidate who is ranked at the r th position receives (c r) votes, where c is the number of candidates. 1 4 Later on in the paper, I shall use a more restrictive notion of sincerity. 1 5 Following previous contributions in the citizen-candidate literature (e.g., Besley and Coate 1996, Dhillon and Lockwood 2002), I shall restrict attention to candidacy equilibria in pure strategies.
Definition 2 (Candidacy equilibrium). A candidacy pro…le e is a candidacy equilibrium if every citizen's candidacy strategy is a best response to the candidacy strategies of the other citizens, given the voting function (:), i.e., U` e `; e `; U` e`; e `; for all citizen`and all e`2 f0; 1g.k Political equilibrium. A political equilibrium (henceforth equilibrium) consists of a pair (e ; (:)) where: (1) (C) is a pro…le of admissible voting strategies for any non-empty set of candidates C; and (2) e is a candidacy equilibrium given the voting function (:).
It remains to de…ne our notion of polarization. For that purpose, I …rst introduce some extra notation. Let E and e E be any two equilibria, and denote by p x (e p x , resp.) the probability that policy x is implemented in equilibrium E ( e E, resp.). I shall write x 2 E (x 2 e E, resp.) if and only if p x > 0 (e p x > 0, resp.).
Definition 3.
Suppose that E and e E are two distinct equilibria. We say that 1. E and e E are equivalent if p x = e p x for all policy x. 2. E is moderate compared to e E if for all x 2 En e E , y 2 E \ e E and z 2 e EnE , we have u m (x) u m (y) u m (z), with a strict inequality for at least one such triple of policies. 3. E is extreme compared to e E if e E is moderate compared to E.k Thus, two equilibria are said to be equivalent if they yield the same lottery over policy outcomes. Also, an equilibrium E is said to be moderate compared to a distinct equilibrium e E if the median citizen: (i) prefers each of the policies that are implemented in equilibrium E to any policy that is speci…c to equilibrium e E; and (ii) prefers each of the policies that are speci…c to equilibrium E to any policy that is implemented in equilibrium e E. Extremism is de…ned as the mirror image of moderation.
We are now ready to de…ne our notion of polarization.
Definition 4 (Polarization). We say that a voting procedure V yields more polarization compared to another voting procedure e V if: 1. every equilibrium under V either is equivalent to an equilibrium under e V or is extreme compared to all equilibria under e V ; and 2. every equilibrium under e V either is equivalent to an equilibrium under V or is moderate compared to all equilibria under V .k
MULTIPLE VOTING RULES
In this section, I study polarization in elections that are held under Multiple Voting rules (hereafter MVs). Under a MV, each citizen is given q votes to cast for the di¤erent candidates, and the candidate who receives the most votes is elected. 16 Ties are broken randomly. Examples of MVs are PV (q = 1), Dual Voting (q = 2) and Approval Voting (q = +1).
Serious equilibria
I start by studying polarization in the context of serious equilibria. An equilibrium is said to be serious if all the candidates are serious contenders, i.e., stand for election to win.
I …rst consider the case where only completely-…lled ballots are admissible, i.e., citizens are forced to cast all their votes. In this context, we have that: Proposition 1. Let V and e V be any two Multiple Voting rules with numbers of votes q and e q, respectively. Consider the set of serious equilibria and suppose that only completely-…lled ballots are admissible. Then, q > e q implies that V always yields more polarization compared to e V .k
To appreciate this result, let e V be PV. Then, e q = 1 and Proposition 1 implies that in the context of serious races, forcing citizens to express preferences for multiple candidates always yields more polarization compared to PV. This result is in sharp contrast with what happens when candidacy is exogenous. This follows because when candidacy is endogenous, giving citizens more votes to cast induces more candidates to stand for election, which strengthens the squeezing e¤ect.
To understand the intuition underlying this result, several things must be noted. First, no multiposition serious equilibrium exists. (A multiposition serious equilibrium is a serious equilibrium with three or more candidates' positions.) This is most easily understood by assuming a serious equilibrium with three candidates' positions, say, x L , x C and x R with x L < x C < x R . Without loss of generality suppose that the expected winning policy A lies (weakly) to the right of x C . Note …rst that there cannot be more than q candidates standing at x L and x C . This is because otherwise one of the candidates at x L , say, candidate h would be better o¤ defecting. Indeed, his votes would then be transferred to the other candidate(s) at x L or x C , which would result in the election of one of these candidates. Since x C A and the utility function is concave, candidate h would (weakly) prefer this policy outcome to the winning lottery and, moreover, would save on the candidacy cost. Hence, this cannot be an equilibrium since candidate h would want to defect. Thus, there are at most q candidates standing on the left of the expected winning policy A. By the same argument, there cannot be more than q candidates standing at x R . It follows that x C must lie strictly to the left of the expected winning policy A. This is because the candidate(s) at x C would otherwise receive unanimous votes and would therefore win the election outright. This would contradict that the equilibrium is serious. Finally, notice that everybody who votes for the candidates at x L also votes for the candidate(s) at x C . However, the converse is not true. Indeed, some among the citizens who are voting for the candidate(s) at x C prefer x R to x L and, therefore, cannot be voting for all the candidates at x L (otherwise they would be voting for all candidates). This implies that each candidate at x C receives more votes than any candidate at x L , which contradicts that the equilibrium is serious. Hence, no serious equilibrium has more than two candidates'positions.
Second, in all one-position serious equilibria only one citizen enters the race and is elected by acclamation. (A one-position serious equilibrium is a serious equilibrium in which all candidates are standing at the same position.) It is then obvious that the set of one-position serious equilibria is independent of the voting procedure. Moreover, these equilibria are moderate compared to all two-position serious equilibria. 17 The extent of polarization therefore depends solely on the two-position serious equilibria. Finally, in all two-position serious equilibria, the two candidates'positions must be symmetric about the median. Moreover, exactly q candidates are standing at each position. This is because more than q candidates standing at the same position would split their votes, thereby helping the election of rival candidates. At the same time, less than q candidates at a position would let some of their votes go to the candidate(s) at the other position, thereby helping the election of the latter candidate(s).
How much polarized the two candidates'positions can be depends on whether moderates can be deterred from entering the race. 18 A moderate is a citizen whose ideal policy lies between the two candidates'positions. Now, a moderate is willing to enter the race only if she anticipates she would receive a plurality of votes. Under PV, a moderate entering the race would receive a vote from all the centrists, whereas the left (right, resp.) candidate would receive a vote from all the leftists (rightists, resp.). 19 A moderate is therefore deterred from entering the race if the mass of centrists does not exceed both the mass of leftists and the mass of rightists. Under a MV with number of votes q 2, a moderate entering the race would still receive votes from and only from the centrists. This is because q candidates are standing at the left (right, resp.) position, which implies that the leftists (rightists, resp.) exhaust all their q votes on the left (right, resp.) candidates. However, after having cast one vote for the moderate the centrists would now have (q 1) other votes that they must cast either for the left candidates or for the right candidates (whichever they prefer). It follows from this discussion that the vote total of each left and right candidate increases with q, whereas the vote total of the moderate candidate is independent of q. The moderate's vote share therefore decreases with q. The bigger q is, the more polarized the left and right candidates'positions can then be while still deterring moderates from entering the race. Hence the result in Proposition 1. 20 The following example illustrates this argument.
Example 1. Consider a community that must elect a representative to choose a tax rate. The set of possible tax rates is given by X = [0; 1]. Let the status-quo tax rate x 0 = 0 (e.g., the community is considering introducing a new tax). 21 Each from the author. 1 8 Notice that MVs are always able to deter extremists from entering the race. An extremist is a citizen whose ideal policy does not lie between the two candidates'positions. 1 9 A centrist is a citizen who would prefer the moderate to the candidates standing at the two positions. A leftist (rightist, resp.) is a citizen who would prefer the candidate(s) standing at the left (right, resp.) position to a moderate and, a fortiori, to the candidate(s) standing at the right (left, resp.) position.
2 0 It is worth mentioning that the same argument holds when the voting behavior is assumed to be strategic. This is hardly surprising since voting is anyway sincere when there are only two candidates'positions. However, things are di¤erent when there are multiple candidates'positions. As I explained above, no multiposition serious equilibrium exists when the voting behavior is sincere. By contrast, multiposition serious equilibria can exist when the voting behavior is strategic and the election is held under a MV with number of votes q 2 (and only completely-…lled ballots are admissible). This is because when voting is strategic the votes of a defecting candidate need not be transferred to his closest possible neighbor, thereby deterring incumbent candidates from defecting. Notice that multiposition serious equilibria need be neither moderate nor extreme compared to PV serious equilibria. It follows that when the voting behavior is strategic and only completely-…lled ballots are admissible, we can only establish that a MV does not always yield less polarization compared to PV.
citizen`has an ideal tax rate x`2 X and obtains a utility u`(x) = jx x`j when the tax rate is x 2 X. Ideal tax rates are uniformly distributed over the set of possible tax rates X. (The median citizen's ideal tax rate is thus equal to 1/2.) Finally, let the candidacy cost = 1=5.
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If the election is held under PV, then the two-position serious equilibrium set is given by fx; 1 xg for x 2 1 6 ; 3 10 , where fx; yg denotes an equilibrium in which (only) the tax rates x and y are implemented with a positive probability. 23 By contrast, the two-position serious equilibrium set is given by fx; 1 xg for x 2 To understand the di¤erence between the two sets, consider and suppose that one candidate is standing at each position. These two candidates would then be tying for the …rst place. Now, if the election is held under PV, no other citizen at 1/8 (7/8, resp.) is willing to enter the race. This is because she would split votes with the other candidate at 1/8 (7/8, resp.), which would result in the outright election of the candidate at 7/8 (1/8, resp.). By contrast, a second citizen at 1/8 will want to enter the race if the election is held under Dual Voting. This is because all the citizens with ideal tax rate below 1/2 would then cast their two votes for the two candidates at 1/8, while all the citizens with ideal tax rate above 1/2 would cast one vote for the candidate at 7/8 and would be forced to cast their other vote for one of the candidates at 1/8. A candidate at 1/8 would then be elected the policymaker, thereby inducing a second candidacy at 1/8. A similar argument holds for 7/8. Now, if the election is held under PV and a citizen at 1/2 enters the race, then all the citizens with ideal tax rate below 5/16 (above 11/16, resp.) will vote for the candidate at 1/8 (7/8, resp.) and all the citizens with ideal tax rate between 5/16 and 11/16 will vote for the candidate at 1/2. The vote total of the candidate at 1/2 will thus be equal to 6/16, whereas the vote totals of the candidates at 1/8 and 7/8 will be equal to 5/16 each. A citizen at 1/2 is therefore willing to enter the race since she would then win outright. Hence, If instead the election is held under Dual Voting and a citizen at 1/2 enters the race, then all the citizens with ideal tax rate below 5/16 (above 11/16, resp.) will cast their two votes for the two candidates at 1/8 (7/8, resp.) and all the citizens with ideal tax rate between 5/16 and 1/2 (1/2 and 11/16, resp.) will cast one vote for the candidate at 1/2 and will cast their other vote for one of the two candidates at 1/8 (7/8, resp.). The vote total of the candidate at 1/2 will still be equal to 6/16, whereas the vote totals of the candidates at 1/8 and 7/8 will now be equal to 13/32 each. No citizen at 1/2 is therefore willing to enter the race since her candidacy would leave the election outcome unchanged. All other citizens are likewise deterred from entering the race. Hence,
is a two-position serious equilibrium when the election is held under Dual Voting (and any MV with …nite number of votes q 2).
To sum up, in PV elections no two candidates share the same platform. This 2 2 It is worth mentioning that under all voting procedures, the one-position serious equilibrium set is given by fxg for x 2 .is because of the splitting-the-vote e¤ ect. Now, this e¤ect is weakened under the other MVs, thereby inducing multiple similar candidacies. 24 These multiple similar candidacies then trigger a dilution e¤ ect, whereby the vote total of a (moderate) candidate gets diluted in a greater mass of votes. In turn, this dilution e¤ect reinforces the squeezing e¤ ect, which leads to more polarization.
One may object that if citizens were let to express preferences for multiple candidates, they would likely not be forced to submit a completely-…lled ballot. The next result studies polarization when truncated ballots are admissible, i.e., citizens are allowed to cast as many of their votes as they wish.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the election is held under a Multiple Voting rule with …nite number of votes q. Then, admitting truncated ballots gives rise to more extreme equilibria, but does not always yield more polarization compared to Plurality Voting.k This result follows because the admissibility of truncated ballots triggers an expansion of the serious equilibrium set. Some of these extra equilibria are extreme compared to all serious equilibria that exist when only completely-…lled ballots are admissible, whereas others are neither moderate nor extreme. This follows because of two things.
First, the two-position serious equilibrium set when truncated ballots are admissible is an extreme superset of the two-position serious equilibrium set when only completely-…lled ballots are admissible. 25 In other words, admitting truncated ballots triggers an expansion of the two-position serious equilibrium set toward the extremes. To understand this, notice that when truncated ballots are admissible, no leftist (rightist, resp.) will ever cast a vote for a right (left, resp.) candidate. Admitting truncated ballots therefore eliminates the incentive for citizens at the two candidates'positions to enter the race in order to capture votes that otherwise would have gone to the candidate(s) standing at the other position. This has an important implication, namely, that the number of candidates standing at a position is no longer …xed (at q), but instead increases (from 1 to q) with the distance between the two candidates'positions. The latter follows because the utility gain from getting one's ideal policy implemented is bigger the more distant the two candidates' positions are. Two-position serious equilibria are therefore of two types. One type consists of these equilibria where q candidates are standing at each of the two candidates'positions. I shall say that these equilibria are saturated. 26 The other type of two-position serious equilibria consists of these equilibria where less than q candidates are standing at each of the two positions. I shall say that these equilibria are non-saturated. Notice from the discussion above that the saturated equilibria are extreme compared to the non-saturated equilibria.
Let us …rst understand why any two-position serious equilibrium when only completely-…lled ballots are admissible has an equivalent two-position serious equi- 2 4 In other words, MVs with number of votes q 2 do not satisfy the Independence of Clones criterion that was proposed by Tideman (1987) . 2 5 Notice that when the number of votes q is relatively small, the superset need not be proper. Also, it is worth mentioning that when truncated ballots are admissible, the two-position serious equilibrium set under a MV with number of votes q is a moderate subset of the two-position serious equilibrium set under a MV with number of votes e q > q. (The proof is available from the author.) In other words, increasing the number of votes each voter is allowed to cast still yields an expansion of the two-position serious equilibrium set toward the extremes (as when only completely-…lled ballots are admissible). 2 6 Notice that all two-position serious equilibria are saturated when only completely-…lled ballots are admissible or when the election is held under PV. librium when truncated ballots are admissible. This is rather obvious if the two candidates'positions are polarized enough (given the candidacy cost) that q citizens are willing to stand at each position, even when truncated ballots are admissible. That the same holds true when the two candidates' positions are less polarized so that less than q citizens are willing to stand at each position follows because it is easier to deter a moderate from entering the race when truncated ballots are admissible compared to when only completely-…lled ballots are admissible. This is because the leftists (rightists, resp.) may then choose to vote for the left (right, resp.) candidate(s) only, whereas the centrists may choose to vote for the moderate candidate as well as for all the left candidates or all the right candidates (whichever they prefer). 27 I call this e¤ect the non-reciprocity e¤ ect. Compared to when only completely-…lled ballots are admissible, the vote total of the moderate candidate would then be the same, whereas the vote total of each left and right candidate would be bigger. The non-reciprocity e¤ect would therefore reinforce the dilution e¤ect -and, in turn, the squeezing e¤ect -, thereby making it easier to deter moderates'entry compared to when only completely-…lled ballots are admissible.
Notice that for those MVs with a number of votes q su¢ ciently large, all twoposition serious equilibria are non-saturated when truncated ballots are admissible. For these MVs, the non-reciprocity e¤ect implies that the two candidates'positions can be even more polarized when truncated ballots are admissible and still deter moderates'entry. Hence the expansion of the two-position serious equilibrium set toward the extremes. It cannot be therefore that admitting truncated ballots always yields less polarization. The following example illustrates this argument.
Example 2. Consider the community described in Example 1. It is trivial to note that admitting truncated ballots does not make any di¤erence if the election is held under PV. The same is not true however if the election is held under Dual Voting. Indeed, the two-position serious equilibrium set is given by fx; 1 xg for x 2 ; 19 20 and suppose that the election is held under Dual Voting. If only completely-…lled ballots were admissible, then two candidates would be standing at 1/20 (19/20, resp.), and all four candidates would be tying for the …rst place. If a citizen at 1/2 was then entering the race, all the citizens with ideal tax rate below 11/40 (above 29/40, resp.) would cast their two votes for the two candidates at 1/20 (19/20, resp.) and all the citizens with ideal tax rate between 11/40 and 1/2 (1/2 and 29/40, resp.) would cast one of their two votes for the candidate at 1/2 and would cast their other vote for one of the candidates standing at 1/20 (19/20, resp.). The vote total of the candidate at 1/2 would therefore be equal to 18/40, whereas the vote totals of the candidates at 1/20 and 19/20 would be equal to 31/80 each. A citizen at 1/2 would therefore want to enter the race since she would be elected outright; her expected utility gain (equal to 9/20) would exceed the candidacy cost. Hence, If instead truncated ballots were admissible, then there would be only one candidate standing at each of the two positions. This is because if a second citizen at, say, 1/20 enters the race, then all the citizens with ideal tax rate below 1/2 will cast their two votes for the two candidates at 1/20, whereas all the citizens with ideal tax rate above 1/2 will cast only one vote for the candidate at 19/20. All three candidates thus tie for the …rst place and 1/20 (19/20, resp.) is implemented with probability 2/3 (1/3, resp.). The expected utility gain for the second candidate at 1/20 is thus equal to 3/20, which is less than the candidacy cost. Hence, no two candidates are standing at 1/20. A similar argument holds for 19/20. Now, if a citizen at 1/2 was entering the race, all the citizens with ideal tax rate below 11/40 (above 29/40, resp.) could then vote only for the candidate at 1/20 (19/20, resp.), whereas all the citizens with ideal tax rate between 11/40 and 1/2 (1/2 and 29/40, resp.) could vote for the candidates at 1/2 and 1/20 (19/20, resp.). In this case, the vote total of the candidate at 1/2 would still be equal to 18/40. However, the vote totals of the candidates at 1/20 and 19/20 would now be equal to 1/2 each. No citizen at 1/2 would therefore be willing to enter the race since her candidacy would leave the election outcome unchanged. All other citizens can be likewise deterred from entering the race. Hence, is a two-position serious equilibrium when truncated ballots are admissible.
Besides yielding an expansion of the two-position serious equilibrium set, the admissibility of truncated ballots also gives rise to multiposition serious equilibria. This follows because of the way the votes of a defecting candidate are transferred. When only completely-…lled ballots are admissible, the votes of a defecting leftmost or righmost candidate would be transferred to his closest possible neighbor, thereby helping the election of that candidate. By contrast, there is no guarantee of vote transfer when truncated ballots are admissible. It follows that incumbent candidates can be deterred from exiting the race -and multiposition serious equilibria can therefore exist -if truncated ballots are admissible, but not if only completely…lled ballots are admissible. (An example is available from the author.) Since multiposition serious equilibria need be neither extreme nor moderate compared to the two-position serious equilibria, it can therefore be concluded that letting voters truncate their ballots does not always yield more polarization.
Proposition 2 o¤ers an interesting contrast with Proposition 1 in Dellis (2009). The latter establishes that when voting is strategic, admitting truncated ballots triggers a contraction of the two-position serious equilibrium set and eliminates the multiposition serious equilibria that can exist when only completely-…lled ballots are admissible. This is because when the voting behavior is strategic and only completely-…lled ballots are admissible, the presence of multiple candidates makes it easier to support self-ful…lling prophecies that deter candidates from defecting. And when truncated ballots are admissible, voters choose to strategically concentrate their votes on at most two candidates'positions (see Dellis 2007) . It follows from this comparison that letting voters truncate their ballots has opposite implications for polarization whether the voting behavior is sincere or strategic.
Spoiler equilibria
I now extend the analysis by taking spoiler equilibria into account. A spoiler equilibrium is an equilibrium in which some of the candidates are spoilers, i.e., stand for election not to win but because their presence in the race yields an election outcome they prefer to the election outcome that would arise otherwise.
I start by ruling out the existence of spoiler equilibria in PV elections. This result follows because under PV, the votes of a defecting candidate go to his neighbor(s), thereby helping the election of the latter(s). With spoilers in the race, a leftmost candidate or a rightmost candidate (or both) would therefore be better o¤ defecting. Indeed, either the election outcome would be left unchanged, or a candidate standing between the defector's ideal policy and the expected winning policy would be elected. In either case, the defector would save on the candidacy cost and, given the concavity of the utility function, would get an election outcome he (weakly) prefers. Defection will occur as long as more than two (serious) contenders are left. 29 By contrast, spoiler equilibria can exist when the election is held under a MV other than PV. This is because the votes of a defecting candidate need no longer be transferred to a close neighbor. Indeed, when only completely-…lled ballots are admissible, the votes of a defector are possibly transferred to a faraway candidate. And when truncated ballots are admissible, voters may react to a candidate's defection by no longer voting for candidates that are close to the defector. Voters may also react by adding votes for candidates that are standing faraway from the defector. In all cases, this may result in the election of a less-preferred candidate, thereby deterring spoilers (and serious contenders for that matter) from defecting. This argument is most easily illustrated for Approval Voting.
Example 3. Consider the community described in Example 1, and suppose that the election is held under Approval Voting. Let the candidacy pro…le be such that four candidates are standing for election: one at 1/20; another one at 1/10; a third one at 9/10; and a last one at 19/20. Also, let the voting pro…le be such that: all the citizens with ideal tax rate at and below 9/20 (above 11/20, resp.) vote for the two candidates at 1/20 and 1/10 (9/10 and 19/20, resp.); all the citizens with ideal tax rate between 9/20 and 1/2 (1/2 and 11/20, resp.) vote only for the candidate at 1/10 (9/10, resp.); and, …nally, all the citizens at 1/2 vote for the two candidates at 1/10 and 9/10. Thus, the candidates at 1/10 and 9/10 tie for the …rst place and are each elected with probability 1/2. Neither of the candidates at 1/20 and 1/10 (9/10 and 19/20, resp.) is willing to defect if they (correctly) anticipate that all citizens would react to their defection by voting for the candidate at 9/10 (1/10, resp.) and any candidate they prefer to the candidate at 9/10 (1/10, resp.); the candidate at 9/10 (1/10, resp.) would therefore receive unanimous votes and would win outright. Likewise, no other citizen with an ideal tax rate at or on the left (right, resp.) of 1/2 is willing to enter the race if they (correctly) anticipate that citizens would likewise react to their candidacy -i.e., would vote for the candidate at 9/10 (1/10, resp.) and any candidate they prefer to the candidate at 9/10 (1/10, resp.). Thus, a spoiler equilibrium exists where 1/10 and 9/10 are each implemented with probability 1/2. Notice that this equilibrium is extreme compared to all PV equilibria. 2 8 Notice that this result is a direct application to the present framework of Proposition 4 of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) . 2 9 Notice that taken together, Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 imply that in all PV equilibria, there are at most two (serious) contenders. This result is consistent with Duverger's law, which states that "the simple-majority single-ballot system [i.e., PV] favors the two-party system" (Duverger 1954, 217) . This law has been explained by the strategic behavior of voters. Interestingly, a two-party system arises here not because of strategic voting but because of strategic candidacy. It is worth mentioning that Fey (2007) establishes a similar result in a setting with four (symmetric) candidates'positions in a two-dimensional policy space.
Thus, spoiler equilibria can exist when the election is held under a MV other than PV. Moreover, these equilibria can be extreme compared to all PV equilibria. Notice that it is likewise possible to construct examples of spoiler equilibria that are neither extreme nor moderate compared to the PV equilibria. We can therefore conclude that: MVs with number of votes q 2 can give rise to spoiler equilibria that are extreme compared to all PV equilibria; but these MVs do not always yield more polarization compared to PV. Notice the similarity between this conclusion and Proposition 2. This is because the presence of spoilers and the admissibility of truncated ballots both a¤ect how the votes of a defecting candidate are transferred, thereby making the elimination of the squeezing e¤ect irrelevant.
Relative Sincerity
Our notion of sincerity puts rather little restriction on the voting behavior when truncated ballots are admissible. Indeed, a citizen can be let to vote only for her most-preferred candidate(s), or she can be let to cast all her votes (short of voting for a least-preferred candidate), or she can be let to cast any number of votes in-between. This results in a (potentially large) multiplicity of admissible voting pro…les, which may undermine the predictive power of the analysis.
In this section, I replace our notion of sincerity with the stronger concept of Relative Sincerity that was proposed by Dellis and Oak (2006) . A citizen is said to vote relatively sincerely if she votes for as many of the candidates she prefers to the winning lottery as possible. Formally, Definition 5 (Relative Sincerity). Suppose that the election is held under an arbitrary Multiple Voting rule with number of votes q. Let e be an arbitrary candidacy pro…le with a non-empty set of candidates C. Citizen`'s voting strategy `( C) is said to be relatively sincere if 1. `( C) is sincere; and 2. for all candidate j who is not (one of) citizen`'s least-preferred candidate(s),
Condition (1) requires that voting is sincere. Condition (2) rules out situations where a voter truncates her ballot (i.e., # `( C) < q) without casting a vote for a candidate she prefers to the winning lottery.
The following result can be established.
Proposition 3. Let V be an arbitrary Multiple Voting rule with number of votes q and suppose that truncated ballots are admissible. Consider the set of serious equilibria and suppose that the voting behavior is relatively sincere. Then, V always yields less polarization compared to Plurality Voting if and only if V is Approval Voting.k Several things must be noted in order to understand this result. First, the set of relatively sincere two-position serious equilibria is equivalent to the set of saturated two-position serious equilibria. This is because the relative sincerity re…nement has no bite when there are q candidates standing at each of the two positions. By contrast, when there are less than q candidates at each position, the relative sincerity re…nement eliminates the non-reciprocity e¤ect. 31 Indeed, when the voting behavior is relatively sincere, the leftists and the rightists do vote for a moderate candidate who they prefer to an equiprobable lottery over the left and right positions. Now, the elimination of the non-reciprocity e¤ect has an important implication, namely, the elimination of the squeezing e¤ect. A moderate is then willing to enter the race since he can expect to receive a plurality of votes and win the election. Hence no two-position serious equilibrium that is non-saturated survives the relative sincerity re…nement.
It follows that when the voting behavior is relatively sincere, no two-position serious equilibrium exists if the election is held under Approval Voting. This is because under Approval Voting the number of votes a citizen can cast is q = +1. Thus, no two-position serious equilibrium can ever be saturated. By contrast, for all other MVs, the number of votes q is …nite. This means that there are communities where saturated two-position serious equilibria do exist. It cannot therefore be that these MVs always yield less polarization compared to PV. This is because: (1) the two-position serious equilibrium set under any MV is an extreme superset of the two-position serious equilibrium set under PV; and (2) the saturated two-position serious equilibria are the most extreme among the two-position serious equilibria. Hence the necessity part of Proposition 3.
The su¢ ciency part of Proposition 3 is understood once one notices that when the voting behavior is relatively sincere no multiposition serious equilibrium exists under Approval Voting. Again, this is because the squeezing e¤ect is eliminated. This is most easily understood by assuming a serious equilibrium with three candidates'positions, say, x L , x C and x R with x L < x C < x R . Either all the citizens on the left of the median or all the citizens on the right of the median (or both) prefer x C to the lottery over x L , x C and x R . They must therefore be voting for all the candidates standing at x C . Clearly, the squeezing e¤ect is eliminated, and a candidate at x C receives votes from more than half of the electorate. Now, without loss of generality suppose that the median citizen likes x L the least. It follows that all the citizens on the right of the median must also like x L the least and, therefore, must not be voting for any of the candidates standing at x L . Thus, each of the candidates standing at x L receives votes from less than half of the electorate and cannot therefore be tying for the …rst place. Hence the non-existence of multiposition serious equilibria.
Thus, when the election is held under Approval Voting and the voting behavior is relatively sincere, all serious equilibria are one-position serious equilibria. Hence the su¢ ciency part of Proposition 3 since these equilibria are equivalent under all voting procedures and are moderate compared to all (PV) two-position serious equilibria. 32 However, once one takes spoiler equilibria into account, even Approval Voting does not always yield less polarization compared to PV. This is because the presence of spoilers still renders the elimination of the squeezing e¤ect irrelevant. This is most easily seen by noting that all voting pro…les in Example 3 are relatively sincere.
Conclusion
The following corollary summarizes our analysis of polarization in MV elections. Corollary 1. A Multiple Voting rule always yields less polarization compared to Plurality Voting if:
1. the Multiple Voting rule is Approval Voting; 2. voting is relatively sincere; and 3. attention is restricted to serious equilibria.k Thus, our analysis shows that when candidacy is endogenous, the claim that letting people vote multiple candidates would lead to less polarization must be quali…ed. Indeed, if any one of the three conditions stated in Corollary 1 is not satis…ed, a MV may end up yielding more rather than less polarization! Notice that condition (1) is imposed on the voting procedure and is therefore a choice for the fathers of the constitution. Instead, conditions (2) and (3) are imposed on endogenous variables. Whether these two conditions would actually be satis…ed is thus an empirical question. There is no a-priori reason to believe they would.
ORDINAL VOTING RULES
In this section, I study polarization in elections that are held under Ordinal Voting rules. Under an Ordinal Voting rule (hereafter OV), each voter must rankorder the candidates. OVs vary in the way voters' rankings are transformed into votes for the di¤erent candidates. In this paper, I consider four di¤erent OVs: One -the Borda Count -is a weighted voting rule; two others -the Single Transferable Vote and Coombs Voting -are instant runo¤ voting rules; and the fourth oneBucklin Voting -is an ordinal variant of Approval Voting.
Borda Count
Under the Borda Count, a voter gives (c r) votes to the candidate she ranks r th on her ballot, where c denotes the number of candidates standing for election. In case truncated ballots are admissible, a voter gives no vote to a candidate she does not rank. The candidate who receives the most votes wins the election. Ties are broken randomly.
Proposition 4.
Suppose that the election is held under the Borda Count and that only completely-…lled ballots are admissible. Consider the set of serious equilibria. Generically, the extent of polarization is minimal.
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Thus, in the context of serious races the Borda Count with only completely-…lled ballots admissible always yields less polarization compared to PV. 34 This result follows because the Borda Count does not satisfy the Independence of Irrelevant 3 3 The genericity of the result follows because for a distribution of citizens' ideal policies with a high concentration of citizens at the extremes and a moderately large candidacy cost, a twoposition serious equilibrium can exist where a leftmost potential candidate and a rightmost potential candidate are standing for election (provided that the median citizen is indi¤erent between these two potential candidates'ideal policies). 3 4 It is worth mentioning that whether this result carries over to spoiler equilibria is still an open question. This is because I have been unable to establish whether spoiler equilibria do exist when the election is held under the Borda Count and only completely-…lled ballots are admissible.
Alternatives criterion, which triggers an inverse squeezing e¤ ect when voters are forced to rank-order all candidates. All serious equilibria are then one-position serious equilibria.
The intuition underlying this result is most easily understood if one assumes a two-position serious equilibrium fx L ; x R g with x L < x R . Take a citizen with ideal policy on the left of x L . Call her citizen h. Every candidate whose position a voter prefers to x h would be ranked above citizen h and would therefore receive one extra vote if citizen h were to enter the race. By contrast, every candidate to whom position a voter prefers x h would be ranked below citizen h and would therefore receive the same number of votes whether citizen h were to enter the race or not. Also, notice that x h < x L < x R implies that any citizen who prefers x R to x h also prefers x L to x h . However, the converse is not true. It follows that the number of citizens who prefer x L to x h exceeds the number of citizens who prefer x R to x h . And since only completely-…lled ballots are admissible, citizen h's candidacy would trigger a greater increase in the vote total of a candidate standing at x L than in the vote total of a candidate standing at x R . In other words, a candidate at x L gains from having candidates standing on either side of his platform. I call this the inverse squeezing e¤ ect. It implies that if citizen h were to enter the race, the vote total of a candidate at x L would exceed the vote total of a candidate at x R . A candidate at x L would therefore be elected the policymaker. Given that a citizen at x L is willing to bear the candidacy cost and run against a candidate at x R , so is citizen h. Hence, this cannot be an equilibrium. The existence of multiposition serious equilibria can likewise be ruled out. It follows that, generically, all serious equilibria are one-position serious equilibria. Hence the result in Proposition 4 since these equilibria are equivalent under all voting procedures and are the most moderate equilibria.
Thus, the result in Proposition 4 follows because the Borda Count is unable to deter extremists from entering the race. There are several interesting things to note about this result.
First, all serious equilibria are one-position serious equilibria whether the election is held under the Borda Count and only completely-…lled ballots are admissible or whether the election is held under Approval Voting and the voting behavior is relatively sincere. However, this happens for di¤erent reasons under the two voting procedures. In the case of the Borda Count, this is because the admissibility of only completely-…lled ballots (together with the dependence to irrelevant alternatives) triggers an inverse squeezing e¤ect that induces extremists to enter the race. By contrast, Approval Voting can always deter extremists from entering the race. However, when the voting behavior is relatively sincere, Approval Voting is able to eliminate the squeezing e¤ect, which induces moderates to enter the race.
Second, whether the voting behavior is sincere or strategic, all serious equilibria are one-position serious equilibria when the election is held under the Borda Count and only completely-…lled ballots are admissible (see Proposition 2 in Dellis 2009). However, this arises for di¤erent reasons. When the voting behavior is sincere, this is because the Borda Count is unable to deter extremists from entering the race. By contrast, when the voting behavior is strategic, the Borda Count can always deter extremists from entering the race. However, it is unable to deter and accomodate multiple similar candidacies at the winning positions.
Finally, the result in Proposition 4 is not robust to the admissibility of truncated ballots. This is because of two things. First, the Borda Count is now able to deter extremists from entering the race. This is because the Borda Count is no longer subject to the inverse squeezing e¤ect since voters need no longer rank all candidates. Second, the Borda Count can also deter moderates from entering the race. This is because the Borda Count is subject to the squeezing and the nonreciprocity e¤ects. The former e¤ect follows because the Borda Count is a weighted voting rule and is therefore unable to fully eliminate the squeezing e¤ect. The second e¤ect follows because of the admissibility of truncated ballots. The ability of the Borda Count to deter both moderates and extremists from entering the race implies that two-and multi-position serious equilibria as well as spoiler equilibria can exist when truncated ballots are admissible. Moreover, these equilibria can be extreme compared to all PV equilibria. This is true even if the voting behavior is relatively sincere. 35 
Instant Runo¤s
I now consider two examples of instant runo¤ voting rules. One is the Single Transferable Vote, also known in Australia as the Alternative Vote. Coombs Voting is the other instant runo¤ voting rule I shall consider here. 36 Under both voting rules, a candidate is elected if he is ranked …rst by a majority of voters. Otherwise, one candidate is eliminated. Under the Single Transferable Vote, the candidate who is eliminated is the candidate with the fewest …rst-placed votes. Under Coombs Voting, the candidate who is eliminated is the candidate with the most last-placed votes. In both cases, ties are broken randomly. The eliminated candidate is then removed from the ballots. If one of the remaining candidates is now ranked …rst by a majority of voters, he is then elected. Otherwise, a second candidate is eliminated. The process is repeated until either one candidate is ranked …rst by a majority of voters or all voters' ballots are exhausted (which can happen if truncated ballots are admissible). In the latter case, the one remaining candidate who is then ranked …rst by a plurality of voters is selected.
Proposition 5. Suppose that only completely-…lled ballots are admissible. Then, the extent of polarization is minimal under Coombs Voting, but not under the Single Transferable Vote.k Thus, Coombs Voting always yields less polarization compared to PV. This is because Coombs Voting satis…es the Condorcet criterion when the policy space is unidimensional and preferences are single-peaked. 37 This implies that Coombs Voting is not subject to the squeezing e¤ect. The same is not true for the Single Transferable Vote.
The intuition underlying this result is most easily understood if one assumes a two-position serious equilibrium fx L ; x R g with x L < x R . 38 Take a moderate, say, citizen k. Under PV, citizen k is deterred from entering the race if the mass of centrists does not exceed both the mass of leftists and the mass of rightists. This is because she would not receive a plurality of votes and would therefore be defeated. Under the Single Transferable Vote, citizen k is deterred from entering the race if the mass of centrists is smaller than both the mass of leftists and the mass of rightists. This is because she would be the …rst candidate to be eliminated. Her candidacy would therefore have for sole e¤ect to lengthen the elimination sequence; it would leave the election outcome unchanged. Hence, both voting procedures are subject to the squeezing e¤ect and can therefore support two-position serious equilibria. 39 It follows that the extent of polarization cannot be minimal. 40 By contrast, under Coombs Voting, citizen k would be elected outright. This is because x k lies between the two candidates' positions (x L and x R ). This implies that citizen k is nobody's least-preferred candidate and, therefore, is not ranked last on any ballot. By contrast, the candidates at x L (x R , resp.) are the least-preferred candidates of all the citizens with ideal policy on the right (left, resp.) of the median and, therefore, are bottom-ranked by all these citizens. The …rst candidate to be eliminated is thus either a candidate at x L or a candidate at x R . Without loss of generality suppose the former. Then, the second candidate to be eliminated is again a candidate at x L (provided more than one candidate is standing at x L ). This is because the last-placed votes of the eliminated candidate are transferred to the other candidates standing at x L . This will repeat until all the candidates at x L have been eliminated and their support has been transferred to citizen k. At that time, citizen k is ranked …rst by a majority of voters and is elected the policymaker. In other words, the squeezing e¤ect is eliminated. It is then easy to check that at least one moderate citizen will want to enter the race. Hence, a two-position serious equilibrium cannot exist when the election is held under Coombs Voting and only completely-…lled ballots are admissible. Multiposition serious equilibria and spoiler These two voting procedures are also able to deter extremists from entering the race. This is because an extremist entering the race would siphon votes from her most-preferred candidate. It follows that whether a two-position serious equilibrium exists depends on whether moderates can be deterred from entering the race. 3 9 It is worth mentioning that the same holds true if the election is held under Plurality Runo¤. Under Plurality Runo¤, there is a …rst election in which each voter votes for one candidate. If a candidate receives a majority of votes, he is then elected. Otherwise, all except the top two vote-getters are eliminated. A runo¤ election is then held in which each voter votes for one of the two remaining candidates. The candidate who receives the most votes in the runo¤ is then elected. This voting procedure is currently used for political elections -especially presidential elections -in several countries (e.g., France and Russia). It is easy to see that the two-position serious equilibrium set under Plurality Runo¤ is equivalent to the two-position serious equilibrium set under the Single Transferable Vote with only completely-…lled ballots admissible. (A formal proof is available upon request.) This is because the order in which candidates are eliminated ends up being the same under both voting procedures.
4 0 Notice that whether the Single Transferable Vote with only completely-…lled ballots admissible always yields less polarization compared to PV is an open question. I have been able to establish that no serious equilibrium under the Single Transferable Vote is extreme compared to all PV equilibria if citizens'ideal policies are uniformly distributed over the set of alternatives X. However, for a generic distribution of citizens'ideal policies, I have only been able to prove that: (1) the two-position serious equilibrium set under the Single Transferable Vote is a moderate subset of the two-position serious equilibrium set under PV; and (2) no three-or four-position serious equilibrium exists under the Single Transferable Vote. (1) follows because the Single Transferable Vote weakens the squeezing e¤ect. (2) follows because a leftmost candidate and/or a rightmost candidate would be better o¤ defecting. Unfortunately, I have been unable to prove (or to disprove for that matter) that the existence of any multiposition serious equilibrium and of spoiler equilibria can be likewise ruled out. This is because the Single Transferable Vote violates the monotonicity criterion, which makes the proof di¢ cult. (For details on the monotonicity criterion see, for example, Nurmi 1999.) equilibria can be likewise ruled out. All equilibria are therefore one-position serious equilibria. Hence the result in Proposition 5 since the one-position serious equilibria are equivalent under all voting procedures and are the most moderate equilibria.
Thus, the order in which candidates are eliminated matters for polarization. Under Coombs Voting, the elimination sequence starts at the extremes and moves toward the median. The squeezing e¤ect is therefore eliminated and the extent of polarization is minimal. By contrast, under the Single Transferable Vote, the elimination sequence can start anywhere, possibly at the median. The squeezing e¤ect is thus preserved, thereby preventing the extent of polarization from being minimal.
There are several interesting things to note about this result. First, when only completely-…lled ballots are admissible, all serious equilibria are one-position serious equilibria whether the election is held under the Borda Count or under Coombs Voting. It is important to note however that this happens for di¤erent reasons. In the case of Coombs Voting, this is because the Condorcet criterion is satis…ed and the squeezing e¤ect is eliminated. Moderates cannot therefore be deterred from entering the race. By contrast, the Borda Count is subject to an inverse squeezing e¤ect, which induces extremists to enter the race.
Second, all serious equilibria are also one-position serious equilibria when the election is held under Approval Voting and the voting behavior is relatively sincere. As for Coombs Voting, this happens because the squeezing e¤ect is eliminated. Notice however that this equivalence disappears once one takes spoiler equilibria into account. Indeed, in the case of Approval Voting, the elimination of the squeezing e¤ect becomes irrelevant once spoiler candidates are standing for election. This is because the multiplicity of admissible voting pro…les makes it easier to support self-ful…lling prophecies that can deter citizens from entering the race and can also deter incumbent candidates from defecting. Spoiler equilibria can therefore exist, and some of these equilibria can be extreme compared to all PV equilibria. By contrast, no spoiler equilibrium exists under Coombs Voting. This is because Coombs Voting satis…es the Condorcet criterion. The presence of spoilers would therefore have for sole e¤ect to lengthen the elimination sequence; it would not a¤ect the election outcome. Spoilers would therefore be better o¤ defecting and saving on the candidacy cost.
Third, no spoiler equilibrium exists whether the election is held under PV or under Coombs Voting. However, this happens for di¤erent reasons. As we have just argued, it happens under Coombs Voting because the defection of a spoiler would leave the election outcome unchanged. By contrast, it happens under PV because the votes of a defecting spoiler would be transferred to his neighbor(s), thereby helping the election of the latter(s).
Finally, admitting truncated ballots removes all bounds on the extent of polarization when the election is held under the Single Transferable Vote. This is because vote abstention would no longer be a weakly dominated voting strategy (even though information is perfect and voting is costless). This is because the Single Transferable Vote is subject to the so-called no-show paradox. 41 The fact that citizens may choose to abstain from voting has important implications for polarization. Indeed, the two-position serious equilibrium set under the Single Transferable Vote is now an extreme superset of the two-position serious equilibrium set under PV. 42 Moreover, multiposition serious equilibria and spoiler equilibria can exist. 4 1 For more details on the no-show paradox see, for example, Nurmi (1999). 4 2 Notice that the reverse holds true when only completely-…lled ballots are admissible, i.e., the This provides a possible rational for admitting only completely-…lled ballots as is done in Australia (and contrary to what was done in Fiji). 43 
Bucklin Voting
I now consider elections that are held under Bucklin Voting. 44 Under Bucklin Voting, a candidate is elected if he is ranked …rst by a majority of voters. Otherwise, second-placed votes are added to the …rst-placed votes. If a candidate now receives votes from a majority of voters, he is then elected. 45 Otherwise, third-placed votes are added. This process continues until either one candidate receives votes from a majority of voters or all voters' ballots are exhausted (which can happen when truncated ballots are admissible). In the latter case, the candidate who receives a plurality of votes is elected.
Throughout this section, I shall restrict attention to the case where truncated ballots are admissible. This is because Bucklin Voting is then an ordinal variation of Approval Voting, in which voters are let to express di¤erential preferences among the candidates they vote for. This provides the main motivation for studying Bucklin Voting.
Proposition 6.
Suppose that the election is held under Bucklin Voting and that truncated ballots are admissible.
1. Consider the set of serious equilibria. Then, the extent of polarization is minimal if the voting behavior is relatively sincere. 2. Spoiler equilibria can exist and can be extreme compared to all Plurality Voting equilibria.k Thus, part (1) implies that in the context of serious races, Bucklin Voting always yields less polarization compared to PV, provided that the voting behavior is relatively sincere. This is because Bucklin Voting is then able to eliminate the squeezing e¤ect. 46 However, part (2) shows that this result is not robust to the presence of spoilers. Indeed, spoiler equilibria can exist under Bucklin Voting (even if the voting behavior is relatively sincere) and some of these spoiler equilibria can be extreme compared to all PV equilibria. This is because again the presence of spoilers renders the elimination of the squeezing e¤ect irrelevant. This happens because of the multiplicity of admissible voting pro…les.
Notice the similarity with the above results on Approval Voting. This sheds some interesting light on an argument often raised against Approval Voting, namely, two-position serious equilibrium set under the Single Transferable Vote is then a moderate subset of the two-position serious equilibrium set under PV. This is because the Single Transferable Vote is able to weaken the squeezing e¤ect when only completely-…lled ballots are admissible. 4 3 It is worth mentioning that I have not investigated the e¤ect of ballot truncation when the election is held under Coombs Voting. This is because the admissibility of truncated ballots would raise issues about what being ranked last would mean and, therefore, which candidate should be eliminated at each elimination round. 4 4 This voting procedure has been proposed by James Bucklin. It had been used for some local political elections in the U.S. at the beginning of the twentieth century. 4 5 In case several candidates are ranked …rst or second by a majority of voters, then the one with a plurality of votes is selected. As usual, ties are broken randomly. 4 6 Notice that the extent of polarization is not minimal if the voting behavior is not relatively sincere. This is because Bucklin Voting is then unable to eliminate the squeezing e¤ect, which implies that multiposition serious equilibria and spoiler equilibria can exist. Some of these equilibria can be extreme compared to all PV equilibria.
that Approval Voting does not allow voters to di¤erentiate between the candidates they vote for. The above result suggests that letting voters express di¤erential preferences for the candidates they vote for might not make much (if any) di¤erence once candidacy decisions are taken into account.
Conclusion
The following corollary concludes our analysis of polarization in Ordinal Voting elections.
Corollary 2. An Ordinal Voting rule always yields less polarization compared to Plurality Voting if this Ordinal Voting rule is Coombs Voting and only completely…lled ballots are admissible.k
Corollary 2 o¤ers an interesting contrast with Corollary 1. Corollary 1 establishes that a MV always yields less polarization compared to PV if the MV is Approval Voting, all equilibria are serious and the voting behavior is relatively sincere. As I had then pointed out, the last two conditions are imposed on endogenous variables. There is therefore no a-priori reason to believe they would actually be satis…ed. By contrast, all conditions in Corollary 2 are imposed on the voting procedure. It thus belongs to the fathers of the constitution to decide whether these conditions would be satis…ed.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have investigated the claim that letting people vote for multiple candidates would lessen polarization. This is because it would eliminate the squeezing e¤ect that characterizes Plurality Voting elections. The present paper shows that this claim must be quali…ed when one takes candidacy decisions into account. More speci…cally, I have found support for the claim if: either (1) the election is held under Approval Voting or Bucklin Voting, the voting behavior is relatively sincere and only serious contenders stand for election; or (2) the election is held under the Borda Count, voters are forced to rank-order all the candidates and only serious contenders stand for election; or (3) the election is held under Coombs Voting and voters are forced to rank-order all the candidates. However, I have also shown that if none of these three cases is met, then letting people vote for multiple candidates can actually yield more polarization compared to Plurality Voting. This happens because: either (1) multiple similar candidacies cannot be deterred, thereby triggering a dilution e¤ect that reinforces the squeezing e¤ect; or (2) spoiling candidacies cannot be deterred, thereby rendering the elimination of the squeezing e¤ect irrelevant; or (3) voters are allowed to truncate their ballots, thereby triggering a multiplicity of admissible voting pro…les, which helps support self-ful…lling prophecies that deter new candidates from entering the race and deter incumbent candidates from defecting.
The present analysis has several limitations that deserve further research. First, multiple equilibria do exist. This happens because candidacy has been endogenized following the citizen-candidate approach to political competition. Given the existence of multiple equilibria, our notion of polarization had to be de…ned over sets of equilibria. This implies that the present analysis cannot address the issue of electoral reform. Indeed, replacing Plurality Voting with a voting procedure that yields more or less polarization need not result in candidates'positions being e¤ectively more or less polarized. Actually, such an electoral reform need bring no change at all if the equilibrium that was reached under Plurality Voting has an equivalent equilibrium under the reformed electoral system. Addressing the issue of electoral reform requires addressing the issue of equilibrium selection. Experimental methods can help shed light on this issue.
A second limitation lies in the assumption that candidates are purely policymotivated. Allowing for a mix of policy-and o¢ ce-motivation is of interest. However, full equilibrium characterization might no longer be possible. Notice though that some of our key results would be strengthened. For example, Coombs Voting with only completely-…lled ballots admissible would still always yield less polarization compared to Plurality Voting. This is because the extent of polarization would be even smaller under Coombs Voting, whereas the extent of polarization would be more substantial under Plurality Voting.
A third limitation lies in the assumptions that were made for comparison purposes. First, the policy space was assumed to be unidimensional. Allowing for a multidimensional policy space is of interest. Second, information was assumed to be complete and perfect. Future research should allow for information imperfections. Third, I have considered one-shot elections. Considering repeated elections represents an important avenue for future research. It would make possible to account for the presence of losing candidates who have motivations di¤erent from spoiling the election.
APPENDIX
I …rst introduce some extra notation. Given a non-empty set of candidates C, let G`(C) fi 2 C : u`(x i ) u`(x k ) for all k 2 Cg be the set of citizen`'s mostpreferred candidates. Also, de…ne L`(C) fi 2 C : u`(x i ) u`(x k ) for all k 2 Cg to be the set of citizen`'s least-preferred candidates. Given a candidacy pro…le e and a voting pro…le (:), let i (e; ) denote candidate i's vote total. Also, de…ne W (e; ) i 2 C (e) : i (e; ) k (e; ) for all k 2 C (e) to be the winning set.
Proof of Proposition 1. I shall prove Proposition 1 via a sequence of three claims. Claim 1.1. Suppose that the election is held under a Multiple Voting rule with …nite number of votes q and that only completely-…lled ballots are admissible. Then, all serious equilibria are one-and two-position serious equilibria.k
Proof of Claim 1.1. Let (e; ) be a serious equilibrium, and assume by way of contradiction that x h < x i < x j for some candidates h, i and j in C (e). Denote the number of candidates by c #C (e). To establish a contradiction, I shall proceed in four steps.
Step 1. I …rst establish that strictly more than q + 1 candidates are standing for election. Assume by way of contradiction that c q + 1. Then, each voter must be voting for c 1 candidates. By the sincerity of the voting behavior, the candidate for whom a citizen does not vote is thus (one of) her least-preferred candidate(s). Pick a leftmost (rightmost, resp.) candidate, say, candidate h (j, resp.). Also, pick candidate i with x i 2 (x h ; x j ). Given the single-peakedness of preferences, we have that f`: i 2 L`(C (e))g = ; and f`: k 2 L`(C (e))g 6 = ; for k = h; j. For all admissible voting pro…le, it must then be that i (e; ) = 1 > k (e; ) for k = h; j, which contradicts that the equilibrium is serious.
Step 2. I now establish that at most q candidates are standing on either side of the expected winning policy A (e; ) 1 #W (e; ) P k2W (e; ) x k . Assume by way of contradiction that # fk 2 C (e) : x k A (e; )g > q. (The argument is similar if one assumes # fk 2 C (e) : x k A (e; )g > q.) Since (e; ) is an equilibrium, it must be that neither of the candidates would be better o¤ defecting. Pick a leftmost candidate, say, candidate h. Consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 0 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. Notice that there are still more than q candidates, which implies that each voter must still be voting for exactly q candidates.
Pick a citizen`arbitrarily. Denote by p k (e p k , resp.) the probability that citizeǹ casts a vote for candidate k when the candidacy pro…le is e (e e, resp.). There are three cases to consider.
1. p h = 0. Then, `( e) = `( e e). 2. p h = 1. Then, we have e p k p k for all candidate k 2 C (e e) with x k A (e; ), with a strict inequality for at least one such candidate. At the same time, e p k = p k for all candidate k 2 C (e e) with x k > A (e; ). 3. p h 2 (0; 1). Then, for all candidate k 2 C (e e) with x k A (e; ), we have that e p k p k . Also, for all candidate k with x k > A (e; ) and for whom p k 2 f0; 1g, we have that e p k = p k . Finally, for all candidate k with x k > A (e; ) and for whom p k 2 (0; 1), it must be that u`(x k ) = u`(x h ). Now, we can ignore the last case since the citizens for whom this equality holds are of mass zero.
It follows that candidates'vote totals are such that for all candidate k in C (e e), k (e e; ) = k (e; ) if x k > A (e; ) k (e e; )
k (e; ) if x k A (e; ) with a strict inequality for at least one candidate k with x k A (e; ). It follows that i 2 W (e e; ) implies x i A (e; ). This, together with the concavity of u (:) and the costly candidacy, implies that U h (e e; ) > U h (e; ) and, therefore, that candidate h is better o¤ defecting. This contradicts that (e; ) is an equilibrium.
Step 3. I now establish that no candidate must be standing at the expected winning policy. Assume by way of contradiction that x i = A (e; ) for some candidate i. Given that there are more than q + 1 candidates (by Step 1) and that at most q candidates are standing on either side of A (e; ) (by Step 2), every citizen must be voting for candidate i. By the same argument as in Step 1, we can then show that i (e; ) > k (e; ) for some leftmost candidate k, which contradicts that the equilibrium is serious.
Step 4. It remains to establish that there is only one candidates' position on either side of the expected winning policy. Assume by way of contradiction that x h < x i < A (e; ) for some candidates h and i. (The argument is similar if one assumes x h > x i > A (e; ).) Without loss of generality, suppose that candidate h is a leftmost candidate and that x i x k for all candidate k with x k < A (e; ). Given Steps 1 and 2, we have for all citizen`that h 2 `( e) implies i 2 `( e). It follows that p h p i . I am going to show that this inequality is strict for a positive mass of citizens.
Pick a rightmost candidate, say, candidate j. Also, pick a citizen`with x`2
. Notice that h 2 L`(C (e)) and u`(x h ) < u`(x j ) < u`(x i ). Assume by way of contradiction that
, it must then be that p 2 f0; 1g. If p = 1, then h 2 L`(C (e)) implies that citizen`votes for every candidate with probability one. This yields a contradiction. If p = 0, then u`(x i ) > u`(x j ) implies p j = 0. Given that every voter must cast q votes and that no more than q candidates are standing on either side of A (e; ), it must then be that p y > 0 and p z > 0 for some candidates y and z with x y < x i < x z . This contradicts
Hence p i > p h for all citizen`with x`2
It follows that i (e; ) > h (e; ), which contradicts that the equilibrium is serious.
Taken together, Steps 3 and 4 imply that there are at most two candidates' positions, which contradicts that x h < x i < x j for some candidates h, i and j.
To establish Proposition 1, it is thus su¢ cient to consider only the two-position serious equilibria. This is because the one-position serious equilibrium set is equivalent under all voting procedures and that any one-position serious equilibrium is moderate compared to all two-position serious equilibria.
Before going further, I must introduce some notation. Let (e; ) be a twoposition serious equilibrium with policy outcome fx L ; x R g, x L < x R . Denote the set of candidates at x L (x R , resp.) by C L (e) (C R (e), resp.). Also, denote the number of candidates standing at x L (x R , resp.) by c L (c R , resp.). 
. I start by establishing that the median citizen must be indi¤erent between x L and x R . Assume by way of contradiction that m <
. It follows that L > R . To establish a contradiction, I shall proceed in three steps.
Step 1. I …rst establish that no more than q candidates are standing at each of the two candidates'positions. Assume by way of contradiction that c L > q. (The argument is similar if one assumes c R > q.) The voting pro…le (e) must then be such that candidates'vote totals are given by
Pick a candidate h with x h = x L . Since (e; ) is an equilibrium, it must be that candidate h would be worse o¤ defecting. Consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 0 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. Notice that there are still at least q candidates standing at x L . The voting pro…le (e e) must then be such that candidates' vote totals are now given by
for all i 2 C L (e e) j (e e; ) = R minfc R ;qg c R for all i 2 C R (e e) :
Clearly, i (e e; ) > i (e; ) and j (e e; ) = j (e; ). Recall that i (e; ) = j (e; ) since the equilibrium is serious. It follows that i (e e; ) > j (e e; ) and, therefore, that W (e e; ) = C L (e e). This, together with the costly candidacy, implies that U h (e e; ) > U h (e; ) and, therefore, that candidate h would be better o¤ defecting. This yields a contradiction. Hence c L q and c R q.
Step 2. I now establish that c L < c R . Proceeding as above, we can infer that candidates'vote totals are given by
For the equilibrium to be serious, it must then be that c L L = c R R . This, together with L > R , implies c R > c L .
Step 3. I now establish the contradiction by showing that a citizen at x L is willing to enter the race. It is easy to check that if a candidate at x L defects, then a candidate at x R will be elected. Since (e; ) is an equilibrium, it must then be that c L c u L (x R ) > so that a candidate at x L would be worse o¤ defecting.
For (e; ) to be an equilibrium, it must be that no other potential candidate would be better o¤ entering the race. Pick a citizen h = 2 C (e) with x h = x L , and notice that her expected utility is given by U h (e; ) = c R c u L (x R ). Consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 1 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. We know from Steps 1 and 2 that c L < c R q. The voting pro…le (e e) must then be such that candidates' vote totals are now given by
It is easy to check that c R > c L implies i (e e; ) > j (e e; ) and, therefore, W (e e; ) = C L (e e). Citizen h's expected utility is thus given by U h (e e; ) = . It follows that citizen h does not want to enter the race only if c L c u L (x R ), which contradicts the above condition for a candidate at x L not to defect. Hence, it cannot be that m <
. Proceeding likewise, we can rule out m >
By an argument similar to the one in Step 1 (Step 3, resp.), it can be established that c L = c R q (c > q, resp.).
We are now ready to establish that exactly q candidates are standing at each position. Assume by way of contradiction that c L = c R < q. Following the lines of Step 3, it can be shown that a potential candidate at x L who is not yet standing for election would be better o¤ entering the race. This contradicts that (e; ) is an equilibrium. Hence c L = c R = q.
The next claim characterizes the set of two-position serious equilibria. Claim 1.3. Suppose that the election is held under a Multiple Voting rule with …nite number of votes q and that only completely-…lled ballots are admissible. There exists a two-position serious equilibrium with policy outcome fx L ; x R g if and only if all the following conditions are satis…ed
> ; 3. for all citizen h with x h 2 (x L ; m), one of the following holds true:
(a)
h F
(There is a similar condition for the citizens with x h 2 (m; x R )); and 4. for all citizen h with x h = m, one of the following holds true:
(a) F
2q+1 and u m (x L ).k Proof of Claim 1.3. (Su¢ ciency) Suppose that all four conditions are satis…ed. I now construct a two-position serious equilibrium with policy outcome fx L ; x R g.
Let the candidacy pro…le e be such that there are exactly 2q candidates standing for election, with q candidates at x L and q other candidates at x R . Construct the voting pro…le (e) such that for all citizen`,
Candidates' vote totals are therefore given by i (e; ) = 1=2 for all candidate i. Hence, if (e; ) is an equilibrium, it is serious and both x L and x R are each implemented with probability 1=2.
For (e; ) to be an equilibrium, it must be that neither of the candidates would be better o¤ defecting. Pick a candidate h with x h = x L . Notice that his expected utility is given by U h (e; ) =
. Consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 0 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. Construct the voting pro…le (e e) such that for all citizen`, `( e e) = fC L (e e) ; C R (e e)g if x`< m fC R (e e)g if x`> m:
Candidates'vote totals are therefore such that j (e e; ) =
) for all candidate i 2 C L (e e) and all candidate j 2 C R (e e). A candidate at x R is thus elected. Candidate h's expected utility is therefore given by U h (e e; ) = u L (x R ). Condition (2) in the statement implies that U h (e; ) > U h (e e; ). Thus, candidate h would be worse o¤ defecting. Construct the voting pro…le (e e) likewise if
For (e; ) to be an equilibrium, it must also be that no other citizen is willing to enter the race. Pick a citizen h = 2 C (e), and consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 1 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. There are three cases to consider.
construct the voting pro…le
(e e) such that for all citizen`,
Candidates' vote totals are therefore such that j (e e; ) = 1 2 > 1 2+1 = i (e e; ) for all candidate i 2 C L (e e) and all candidate j 2 C R (e e). A candidate at x R is thus elected, which implies that U h (e; ) > U h (e e; ). Proceed
Suppose that x h < x L . Construct the voting pro…le (e e) such that for all citizen`,
Clearly, a candidate at x R is elected which, together with the single-peakedness of u (:), implies U h (e; ) < U h (e e; ). Proceed likewise if
such that for all citizen`,
; m fh; C R (e e)g if x`2 m;
Notice that the symmetry of u (:) and the symmetry of the density function
, with a strict inequality if x h < m. It follows that j (e e; ) i (e e; ) for all candidate i 2 C L (e e) and all candidate j 2 C R (e e), with a strict inequality if x h < m. It follows that I need consider only the vote totals of citizen h and of the candidates at x R :
h (e e; ) = F
Now, one of the following must be true:
, in which case W (e e) = fhg and U h (e e) = . Conditions 3 and 4 in the statement imply that U h (e; ) U h (e e; ) in all cases. Proceed likewise if x h 2 (m; x R ). Thus, citizen h would be worse o¤ entering the race. Finally, for all other candidacy pro…le b e, let (b e) be any admissible voting pro…le. Thus, (e; ) is a two-position serious equilibrium.
(Necessity) Let (e; ) be a two-position serious equilibrium with policy outcome fx L ; x R g. The necessity of condition (1) follows from Claim 1.2.
Assume by way of contradiction that condition (2) is not satis…ed. Recall from Claim 1.2 that c L = c R = q and, therefore, that both x L and x R are implemented with probability 1/2. Pick a candidate h with x h = x L , and notice that his expected utility is given by U h (e; ) =
. Consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 0 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. A voting pro…le (e e) is here admissible only if it is as described in the su¢ ciency part. It follows that W (e e; ) = C R (e e) and candidate h's expected utility U h (e e; ) = u L (x R ). The violation of condition (2) thus implies U h (e e; ) U h (e; ). Candidate h would therefore be better o¤ defecting, which contradicts that (e; ) is an equilibrium.
Assume by way of contradiction that there exists a citizen h for whom condition (3) or condition (4) is not satis…ed. Consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 1 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. It is easy to see that all admissible voting pro…les must be as described in the su¢ ciency part and, therefore, that U h (e e; ) > U h (e; ). Citizen h would therefore be better o¤ entering the race, which contradicts that (e; ) is an equilibrium.
Let V and e V be any two MVs with …nite numbers of votes q and e q, respectively. Suppose that q > e q. It is easy to see from Claims 1.2 and 1.3 that any two-position serious equilibrium under e V has an equivalent two-position serious equilibrium under V . It is likewise easy to see that there can exist two-position serious equilibria under V for which no equivalent two-position serious equilibrium exists under e V . (Example 1 provides an example for q = 2.) Thus, the set of two-position serious equilibria under e V is a subset of the set of two-position serious equilibria under e V . It remains to prove that the subset is moderate. Let there be a two-position serious equilibrium (e; ) with policy outcome fx L ; x R g when the election is held under V . Also, let there be a two-position serious equilibrium (b e; b ) with policy outcome fb x L ; b x R g when the election is held under e
To prove the moderation, it is su¢ cient to show that there exists a twoposition serious equilibrium (e e; e ) under e V which is equivalent to (e; ). From now on, suppose that the election is held under e V . Construct the candidacy pro…le e e such that exactly 2e q candidates are standing for election, with e q candidates at x L and e q other candidates at x R . Construct the voting pro…le e (e e) such that e `( e e) = fC L (e e)g (fC R (e e)g, resp.) for all citizen`with x`< m (x`> m, resp.). Clearly, W (e e; e ) = C (e e) and both x L and x R are each implemented with probability 1/2. Proceeding as in the proof of Claim 1.3, we can construct a voting pro…le e (:) such that neither candidate would be better o¤ defecting and no other potential candidate would be better o¤ entering the race. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let the election be held under a MV with …nite number of votes q. I start by characterizing the set of two-position serious equilibria when truncated ballots are admissible. I shall do so via a sequence of two claims that parallel Claims 1.2 and 1.3.
Claim 2.1. Suppose that the election is held under a Multiple Voting rule with number of votes q and that truncated ballots are admissible. Then, in any two-position serious equilibrium with policy outcome fx L ; x R g, we have u m (x L ) = u m (x R ) and the numbers of candidates at each position are such that c L = c R q and
.k Proof of Claim 2.1. Let (e; ) be a two-position serious equilibrium with policy outcome
. This implies that the voting pro…le (e) must be such that for all citizen`, we have
Candidates'vote totals are therefore given by
for all j 2 C R (e) :
I …rst establish that no more than q candidates are standing at each of the two candidates' positions. Assume by way of contradiction that c L > q. (The argument is similar if one assumes c R > q.) The vote total of a candidate i with
Pick a candidate h with x h = x L , and consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 0 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. Then, in any admissible voting pro…le (e e) we have `( e e) we have `( e e) = fC L (e e)g for all citizen`with x`<
and `( e e) = `( e) for all other citizen`. The vote total of every candidate i 2 C L (e e) is thus given by
At the same time, we have j (e e; ) = j (e; ) for all candidate j 2 C R (e e). Moreover, i (e; ) = j (e; ) since (e; ) is a serious equilibrium. It follows that i (e e; ) > j (e e; ) and, therefore, W (e e; ) = C L (e e). This implies that U h (e e; ) > U h (e; ). Thus, candidate h would be better o¤ defecting, which contradicts that (e; ) is an equilibrium. Now, c L q and c R q imply that i (e; ) = L and j (e; ) = R . Since (e; ) is a serious equilibrium, it must be that i (e; ) = j (e; ), which implies
and u m (x L ) = u m (x R ). It is easy to check that a candidate would not be better o¤ defecting only if
> . Also, it is easy to check that if c L < q (c R < q, resp.) no other potential candidate at x L (x R , resp.) is willing to enter the race only if
. Finally, c L = c R follows from the symmetry of u (:).
The following claim characterizes the set of two-position serious equilibria. Claim 2.2. Suppose that the election is held under a Multiple Voting rule with number of votes q and that truncated ballots are admissible. There exists a two-position serious equilibrium with policy outcome fx L ; x R g if and only if all the following conditions are satis…ed
, the latter inequality only if c < 2q; 3. for all citizen h with x h 2 (x L ; m), one of the following holds true:
and =+1 otherwise. (There is a similar condition for the citizens with x h 2 (m; x R )); and 4. for all citizen h with x h = m, one of the following holds true:
and = 3q+1 2q+1 otherwise.k Proof of Claim 2.2. (Su¢ ciency) Suppose that all conditions in the statement are satis…ed. I now construct a two-position serious equilibrium with policy outcome fx L ; x R g. Let the candidacy pro…le e be such that there are c L candidates standing at x L and c R candidates standing at x R , where c L and c R satisfy the conditions in Claim 2.1. Construct the voting pro…le (e) such that for all citizeǹ , we have
Candidates' vote totals are therefore given by i (e; ) = 1=2 for all candidate i. This, together with c L = c R (by Claim 2.1), implies that x L and x R are each implemented with probability 1/2.
. Consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 0 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. Construct the voting pro…le (e e) such that for all citizen`,
Clearly, the vote total of every candidate i is i (e e; ) = 1=2. Candidate h's expected utility is therefore given by U h (e e; ) =
. Condition (2) in the statement implies U h (e; ) > U h (e e; ). Thus, candidate h would be worse o¤ defecting. Proceed likewise if x h = x R .
For (e; ) to be an equilibrium, it must also be that no other citizen is willing to enter the race. Pick a citizen h = 2 C (e), and notice that her expected utility is given by U h (e; ) =
. Consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 1 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. There are four cases to consider.
; m fC R (e e)g if x`> m.
Clearly, W (e e; ) = C R (e e), i.e., a candidate at x R is elected. This, together with the single-peakedness of u (:), implies U h (e; ) > U h (e e; ).
Either c L < q, in which case W (e e; ) = C (e e) and citizen h's expected utility is given by U h (e e; ) = c c+1
. Or c L = q, in which case W (e e; ) = C R (e e) and citizen h's expected utility is given by U h (e e; ) = u L (x R )
. Condition (2) implies that in both cases U h (e; ) U h (e e; ). Proceed likewise if
. Then, construct the voting pro…le (e e) such that for all citizen`,
Notice that x h < m and the symmetry of the density function of f (:) imply that F
and, therefore, that i (e e; ) < j (e e; ) for all candidate i 2 C L (e e) and all candidate j 2 C R (e e). Only the vote totals of citizen h and of the candidates j at x R must therefore be considered:
8 < :
Let q 1+q if c R = q, and = 1 otherwise. One of the following must hold true:
, in which case W (e e; ) = C R (e e) and U h (e e; ) = u h (x R ) .
, in which case W (e e; ) = C R (e e) [ fhg and U h (e e; ) =
, in which case W (e e; ) = fhg and U h (e e; ) = . Condition (3) in the statement implies that in all cases U h (e; ) U h (e e; ). Proceed likewise if x h 2 (m; x R ).
4. x h = m. Construct the voting pro…le (e e) such that for all citizen`,
Notice that the symmetry of the density function f (:) implies that F
and, therefore, that i (e e; ) = j (e e; ) for all candidate i 2 C L (e e) and all candidate j 2 C R (e e). Let < 2 , in which case W (e e; ) = C (e) and U h (e e;
= 2 , in which case W (e e; ) = C (e e) and U h (e e; ) =
> 2 , in which case W (e e; ) = fhg and U h (e e; ) = . Condition (4) in the statement implies that in all cases U h (e; ) U h (e e; ). Thus, citizen h would be worse o¤ entering the race. Finally, for all other candidacy pro…le b e, let (b e) be any admissible voting pro…le. Thus, (e; ) is a two-position serious equilibrium.
(Necessity) Let (e; ) be a two-position serious equilibrium with policy outcome fx L ; x R g. The necessity of conditions (1) and (2) follows from Claim 2.1. The necessity of conditions (3) and (4) is proven by showing that if there exists a citizen for which the condition is not satis…ed, then this citizen would necessarily be better o¤ entering the race, which would contradict that (e; ) is an equilibrium.
Comparing Claim 1.3 and Claim 2.2, it is easy to see that any two-position serious equilibrium when only completely-…lled ballots are admissible. It is likewise easy to see that there can exist two-position serious equilibria when truncated ballots are admissible for which there is no equivalent two-position serious equilibrium when only completely-…lled ballots are admissible. (Example 2 provides an example for q = 2.) Thus, the set of two-position serious equilibria when only completely-…lled ballots are admissible is a subset of the set of two-position serious equilibria when truncated ballots are admissible. That the subset is moderate follows because it is only for moderates that there may not exist a voting pro…le that deters them from entering the race and that conditions (3) and (4) in Claim 1.3 are more di¢ cult to satisfy compared to conditions (3) and (4) in Claim 2.2. 47 Recall from Claim 1.1 that when only completely-…lled ballots are admissible, all serious equilibria are one-and two-position equilibria. Moreover, any one-position serious equilibrium is moderate compared to all two-position serious equilibria. Finally, I have just shown that the two-position serious equilibrium set when only completely-…lled ballots are admissible is a moderate subset of the two-position serious equilibrium set when truncated ballots are admissible. Taken together, these results establish the …rst part of Proposition 2, namely, that admitting truncated ballots gives rise to more extreme equilibria.
It remains to show that admitting truncated ballots does not always yield more polarization compared to PV. This is easily done by constructing examples of multiposition serious equilibria that are neither moderate nor extreme compared to any PV equilibrium. (To save on space, such examples are omitted here but are available from the author upon request.) Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1. I am going to prove the result via a sequence of three claims. The …rst claim established that in equilibrium no two candidates are standing at the same position. It also establishes that at most two candidates are serious contenders.
Claim L.1. Suppose that the election is held under Plurality Voting. Then, in any equilibrium (e; ), we have x i 6 = x j for all candidates i and j. Moreover, #W (e; ) 2.k
Proof of Claim L.1. Let (e; ) be an equilibrium. I …rst establish that no two candidates are standing at the same position. Assume by way of contradiction that x i = x j for some candidates i and j. Since (e; ) is an equilibrium, it must be that neither candidate would be better o¤ defecting. Consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e i = 0 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = i. Then, we have for all citizen`that
and e p k = p k for all candidate h 2 C (e e) with x h = x i and all candidate k 2 C (e e) with x k 6 = x i . 48 It follows that h (e e; ) > h (e; ) for all candidate h 2 C (e e) with x h = x i , whereas k (e e; ) = k (e; ) for all other candidate k 2 C (e e). This, together with the costly candidacy, implies that U i (e e; ) > U i (e; ) and, therefore, that candidate i would be better o¤ defecting. This contradicts that (e; ) is an equilibrium.
I now establish that there are at most two serious contenders. Assume by way of contradiction that #W (e; ) 3. Given that no two candidates are standing at the same position, there must then exist three serious contenders, say, L, M and R with x L < x M < x R Without loss of generality suppose that L is the leftmost serious contender and suppose that x M A (e; ). I start by showing that candidate L is the leftmost candidate. Assume by way of contradiction that x h < x L for some candidate h. Since (e; ) is an equilibrium, it must be that candidate h would be worse o¤ defecting. Consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 0 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. Call i the leftmost candidate in C (e e), and notice that x i x L < A (e; ). Clearly, i (e e; ) = h (e; ) + i (e; ) i (e; ) and k (e e; ) = k (e; ) for all candidate k 2 C (e e), k 6 = i. Given the concavity of u (:) and the costly candidacy, we have U h (e e; ) > U h (e; ). Thus, candidate h would be better o¤ defecting, which contradicts that (e; ) is an equilibrium. Thus, candidate L is the leftmost candidate. Repeating the same argument, it can be shown that candidate L would be better o¤ defecting, which contradicts that (e; ) is an equilibrium.
The next claim rules out the existence of spoiler equilibria with only one serious contender.
Claim L.2. Suppose that the election is held under Plurality Voting. Then, no spoiler equilibrium (e; ) exists with #W (e; ) = 1.k Proof of Claim L.2. Let (e; ) be a spoiler equilibrium. Assume by way of contradiction that W (e; ) = fig. Since no two candidates are standing at the same position (by Claim L.1), there must be a candidate h with ideal policy x h 6 = x i . Without loss of generality suppose that candidate h is the leftmost candidate (and, therefore, that x h < x i ). Proceeding as in the proof of Claim L.1, it can be shown that candidate h would be better o¤ defecting, which contradicts that (e; ) is an equilibrium.
The last claim rules out the existence of spoiler equilibria with two serious contenders.
Claim L.3. Suppose that the election is held under Plurality Voting. Then, no spoiler equilibrium (e; ) exists with #W (e; ) = 2.k
Proof of Claim L.3. Let (e; ) be a spoiler equilibrium. Assume by way of contradiction that W (e; ) = fi; jg and that x i < x j . There must be a (spoiler) candidate h with x h 6 = x i ; x j . Proceeding as in the proof of Claim L.1, it can be shown that x h 2 (x i ; x j ). Without loss of generality suppose that x h A (e; ). Then, proceeding again as in the proof of Claim L.1, it can be shown that candidate i would be better o¤ defecting, which contradicts that (e; ) is an equilibrium.
Taken together, Claims L.1-L.3 rule out the existence of a spoiler equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. I shall prove the result via a sequence of three claims. The …rst claim establishes that the set of relatively sincere two-position serious equilibria is equivalent to the set of saturated two-position serious equilibria. For (e; ) to be an equilibrium, it must be that neither of the candidates would be better o¤ defecting. Pick a candidate h, and consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 0 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. Notice that there are now at most two candidates'positions, which implies that the voting pro…le b (e e) is relatively sincere. So, let (e e) = b (e e). Proceeding likewise for all candidates other than h.
For (e; ) to be an equilibrium, it must be that no other citizen is willing to enter the race. Pick a citizen h = 2 C (e), and notice that her expected utility is given by U h (e; ) =
. Consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 1 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. There are three cases to consider.
1. x h 2 fx L ; x R g : Construct the voting pro…le (e e) as in the proof of Claim 2.2. Given that c L = c R = q, (e e) is relatively sincere. It follows that U h (e; ) U h (e e; ).
Suppose that x h < x L . Construct the voting pro…le (e e) as in the proof of Claim 2.2, except that `( e e) = fh; C L (e e)g for all citizenẁ ith x`<
. It is easy to check that W (e e; ) = C R (e e), which implies U h (e; ) > U h (e e; ). Proceed likewise if x h > x R . 3. x h 2 (x L ; x R ) : Construct the voting pro…le (e e) such that for all citizen`,
Since (b e; b ) is a two-position serious equilibrium, conditions (3) and (4) in Claim 2.2 must be satis…ed. It is not di¢ cult to check that (e e) is here such that the same is true for (e; ) and, therefore, that U h (e; ) U h (e e; ). Thus, in all cases citizen h would be worse o¤ entering the race. Finally, for all other candidacy pro…le e, let (e) be any relatively sincere voting pro…le. Thus, (e; ) is a relatively sincere two-position serious equilibria.
(Necessity) Let (e; ) be a relatively sincere two-position serious equilibrium. The symmetry of u (:) implies c L = c R . To prove the result, it is su¢ cient to establish that (e; ) is saturated, i.e., c L = c R = q. Assume by way of contradiction that c L = c R < q. Pick a citizen h with x h 2 (x L ; x R ), and notice that her expected utility is given by U h (e; ) =
. Since (e; ) is an equilibrium, it must be that candidate h would be worse o¤ entering the race. Consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 1 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. Suppose that x h A (e e; ). (This assumption will turn out to be without loss of generality.) Given that c R < q and u (:) is concave, we have u`(x h ) U`(e e; ) for all citizen`with x` x h . All these citizens must then be casting a vote for h. The same must be true for all citizeǹ with x`2
; x h since h is their most-preferred candidate. It follows that h (e e; )
1 F
It follows that
x L +x h 2 < m, which implies that h (e e; ) > 1=2. At the same time, neither citizen`with x` m (x` m, resp.) must be voting for a candidate at x R (x L , resp.) since these candidates are the ones she likes the least. It follows that k (e e; ) 1=2 for all candidate k 6 = h. Thus, h is elected outright (and, therefore, x h = A (e e; )), which implies that U h (e e; ) = . Notice that the above argument must hold for all citizen h with x h 2 (x L ; x R ). Write citizen h's ideal policy x h as (x R ") for " > 0. For h to not be willing to enter the race, it must be that U h (e; ) U h (e e; ). Letting " go toward zero, we get
The latter inequality implies that condition (2) in Claim 2.2 is not satis…ed, which contradicts that (e; ) is an equilibrium. Recall from Proposition 2 that when truncated ballots are admissible, the twoposition serious equilibrium set under a MV is an extreme superset of the twoposition serious equilibrium set under PV. Moreover, under any MV all saturated two-position serious equilibria are extreme compared to all non-saturated twoposition serious equilibria. Claim 3.1 thus implies that a MV can yield less polarization compared to PV only if no two-position serious equilibrium is saturated. The following claim establishes that Approval Voting is the only MV under which the set of saturated two-position serious equilibria is always empty.
Claim 3.2. Suppose that the election is held under a Multiple Voting rule and that truncated ballots are admissible. Then, the set of relatively sincere twoposition serious equilibria is always empty if and only if the Multiple Voting rule is Approval Voting.k Proof of Claim 3.2. De…ne S ffx L ; x R g 2 X 2 : x L < m < x R and u m (x L ) = u m (x R )g to be the set of potential two-position serious equilibrium outcomes. Let fx L ; x R g sup
jx L x R j and de…ne q as the integer that satis…es the following condition
Thus, q is de…ned such that no two-position serious equilibrium exists with more than q candidates at each position. It follows that q > q implies that no twoposition serious equilibrium is saturated. This, together with Claim 3.1, implies that the set of relatively sincere two-position serious equilibria is thus empty. That the set of relatively sincere two-position serious equilibria is always empty under Approval Voting follows because under Approval Voting the number of votes q = +1. For all other MVs, the number of votes q is …nite. Notice that lim #0 q = +1. Thus, for all MVs other than Approval Voting, there exist a su¢ ciently low candidacy cost and a su¢ ciently dispersed distribution of ideal policies f (:) such that saturated -and, therefore, relatively sincere -two-position serious equilibria do exist.
It follows that Approval Voting is the only MV that can always yield less polarization compared to PV. Hence the necessity part of Proposition 3.
The next claim establishes that all relatively sincere serious equilibria under Approval Voting are one-position serious equilibria. This will prove the su¢ ciency part of Proposition 3 given that the set of one-position serious equilibria is equivalent under all voting procedures and that these equilibria are moderate compared to all two-position serious equilibria under PV. Claim 3.3. Suppose that the election is held under Approval Voting. Then, the set of relatively sincere serious equilibria is equivalent to the set of one-position serious equilibria.k Proof of Claim 3.3. (Necessity) Let (e; ) be a relatively sincere serious equilibrium. Assume by way of contradiction that (e; ) is not a one-position serious equilibrium. Given Claim 3.2, there must then be at least three candidates' positions.
Pick a candidate h who is (one of) the median citizen's least-preferred candidate(s). Clearly, candidate h is either a leftmost candidate or a rightmost candidate. Suppose the former. Then, candidate h is a least-preferred candidate of all citizeǹ with x` m. It follows that neither of these citizens cast a vote for candidate h and, therefore, that h (e; ) 1=2. Pick a candidate j who is (one of) the median citizen's most-preferred candidate(s). Without loss of generality, suppose that x j A (e; ). Relative sincerity then implies that all citizen`with x` x j casts a vote for candidate j. There are two cases to consider.
1. All the median citizen's most-preferred candidates are standing at the same position. Either x j < m, in which case j (e; ) > 1=2. Or x j m, in which case there exists x < m such that j 2 G`(C (e)) for all citizen`with x`2 (x; x j ). All these citizens must therefore be voting for candidate j. It follows again that j (e; ) > 1=2. This, together with h (e; ) 1=2, contradicts that (e; ) is a serious equilibrium. 2. The median citizen's most-preferred candidates are standing at two positions.
Pick one such candidate i with x i 6 = x j . Notice that x i < A (e; ) < x j since otherwise relative sincerity would imply that i (e; ) > 1=2 and/or j (e; ) > 1=2, which would contradict that (e; ) is a serious equilibrium. Also, notice that u m (x i ) = u m (x j ) implies that x i < m < x j .
By the same argument as above, we can establish that all citizen`with x` m must be casting a vote for candidate j, which implies that j (e; ) 1=2. Since (e; ) is a serious equilibrium, it must then be that h (e; ) = 1=2 and, therefore, that all citizen`with x`< m must be voting for candidate h. Since u m (x j ) > u m (x h ) and x h < m < x j , there must exist x 2 (x h ; m) such that u`(x h ) T u`(x j ) for all citizen`with x`S x. Given the sincerity of the voting behavior, for all citizen`with x`2 (x; m), we have that h 2 `( e) implies that j 2 `( e). But then j (e; ) > 1=2 = h (e; ), which contradicts that (e; ) is a serious equilibrium. (Su¢ ciency) Let (e; ) be a one-position serious equilibrium. Then, there is only one candidate standing for election. It is then trivial to show that an equivalent relatively sincere serious equilibrium exists. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Given a number of candidates c, let s k (c) = (c k) be the number of votes that go to the candidate who is ranked at the k th position on a voter's ballot. I shall prove the result by establishing that all serious equilibria are one-position serious equilibria. To do so, I shall proceed via a sequence of three claims. The …rst claim speci…es necessary conditions for a two-position serious equilibrium.
Claim 4.1. Suppose that the election is held under the Borda Count and that only completely-…lled ballots are admissible. Then, in any two-position serious equilibrium with policy outcome fx L ; x R g, we have u m (x L ) = u m (x R ). Moreover, the numbers of candidates standing at each position, c L and c R , must be such that c L = c R and
Proof of Claim 4.1. Let (e; ) be a two-position serious equilibrium with policy outcome
. The voting pro…le (e) is therefore such that for all citizen`,
Since (e; ) is a serious equilibrium, it must be that i (e; ) = j (e; ), which implies that F
Since (e; ) is an equilibrium, it must be that neither candidate would be better o¤ defecting. Pick a candidate h with x h = x L , and notice that his expected utility is given by
. Consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 0 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. Either c L = 1, in which case W (e e; ) = C R (e e). Otherwise, the voting pro…le (e e) must be such that `( e e) = fC L (e e) ; C R (e e)g for all citizen`with x`< m and `( e e) = fC R (e e) ; C L (e e)g for all citizen`with x`> m. It is easy to check that i (e e; ) = 1=2 for all candidate i 2 C (e e) and, therefore, that W (e e; ) = C (e e). Thus, in all cases candidate h's expected utility is given by
. It follows that candidate h would be worse o¤ defectingi.e., U h (e; ) > U h (e e; ) -only if
Since (e; ) is an equilibrium, it must also be that no other citizen is willing to enter the race. Pick a citizen h = 2 C (e) with x h = x L , and notice that her expected utility is given by U h (e; ) = c R c u L (x R ). Consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 1 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. Then, the voting pro…le (e e) is as de…ned above and candidates'vote totals are given by i (e e; ) = 1=2 for all candidate i 2 C (e e). Citizen h's expected utility is therefore given by U h (e e; ) =
. It follows that citizen h would be worse o¤ entering the race -i.e., U h (e; ) U h (e e; ) -only if
The conditions on c L and c R follows from the two inequalities with respect to the candidacy cost and the symmetry of u (:) (the latter implying that c L = c R ).
The next claim rules out the existence of two-position serious equilibria. Claim 4.2. Suppose that the election is held under the Borda Count and that only completely-…lled ballots are admissible. Generically, no two-position serious equilibrium exists.k
Proof of Claim 4.2. Assume by way of contradiction that (e; ) is a twoposition serious equilibrium with policy outcome fx L ; x R g, x L < x R . Since (e; ) is an equilibrium, it must be that no other citizen is willing to enter the race. Pick a citizen h with x h < x L . (Notice that generically such a citizen exists.) Notice that citizen h's expected utility is given by U h (e; ) =
. Consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 1 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. The voting pro…le (e e) is therefore such that for all citizen`,
fC L (e e) ; C R (e e) ; hg if x`2
; m fC R (e e) ; C L (e e) ; hg if x`> m: Candidates'vote totals are then given by
for all candidate i 2 C L (e e) and all candidate j 2 C R (e e). Since F
, we get that i (e e; ) > h (e e; ) and i (e e; ) > j (e e; ). Hence W (e e; ) = C L (e e) and, therefore, citizen h's expected utility is given by U h (e e; ) = u h (x L )
. It follows that citizen h would be worse o¤ entering the race if
. Since (e; ) is an equilibrium, it must also be that neither of the candidates would be better o¤ defecting. We know from Claim 4.1 that his holds true only if
> . Taken together, these two inequalities with respect to imply
It follows from these inequalities that
, which yields a contradiction.
The next claim rules out the existence of multiposition serious equilibria. Claim 4.3. Suppose that the election is held under the Borda Count and that only completely-…lled ballots are admissible. Then, no multiposition serious equilibrium exists.k
Proof of Claim 4.3. Assume by way of contradiction that (e; ) is a multiposition serious equilibrium. Let x L (x R , resp.) be the leftmost (rightmost, resp.) candidates'position. Let y (z, resp.) be the candidates'position that is the closest to x L (x R , resp.). Hence x L < y z < x R . Finally, denote the number of candidates standing at x L (y, z, x R , resp.) by c L (c y , c z , c R , resp.).
Pick two candidates, say, h and i with x h = x L and x i = y. Notice that u`(x L ) T u`(y) for all citizen`with ideal policy x`S x L +y 2 . De…ne h;i h (e; )
i (e; ) to be candidate h's plurality over candidate i. On the interval 1;
, it is given by h;i 1;
On the interval are of mass zero, we can ignore them and let h;i = h;i 1;
x L +y 2 + h;i x L +y 2 ; 1 . Since (e; ) is a serious equilibrium, it must be that h;i = 0, which implies that F m. Pick two candidates, say, j and k with x j = z and x k = x R . Notice that u`(z) T u`(x R ) for all citizen`with ideal policy x`S z+x R 2 . Proceeding as above, we get that F Before proving Proposition 5, I must introduce some extra notation. Let the election be held under an instant runo¤ voting rule. Given a candidacy pro…le e and a voting pro…le (e), let denote an elimination sequence, i.e., an order in which candidates are eliminated. I shall say that a candidate is active at elimination round t 2 f1; 2; :::; cg if he has not yet been eliminated by that round. Let C t (e; ) C (e) be the set of candidates who are active at elimination round t.
49 Let i t (e; ) denote the mass of voters who, at elimination round t, are ranking candidate i …rst. I shall call i t (e; ) candidate i's support at elimination round t.
Proof of Proposition 5. I start by considering the case where the election is held under Coombs Voting and only completely-…lled ballots are admissible. Notice that at any elimination round t, a candidate is ranked last by some voters only if this candidate is either (one of) the leftmost active candidate(s) or (one of) the rightmost active candidate(s). It follows that only one of these candidates is eliminated at round t.
To prove the result stated in Proposition 5, it is su¢ cient to show that all equilibria are one-position serious equilibria when the election is held under Coombs Voting and only completely-…lled ballots are admissible. I start by establishing that in any equilibrium all serious contenders are Condorcet winners. u m (x k ) who is in the winning set W (e; ). Suppose that x i < x j . (The argument is similar if one assumes x i > x j .) Since i 2 W (e; ), there must exist an elimination sequence in which candidate i is the …rst candidate to receive majority support. Formally, h t (e; ) 1 2 for all candidate h 2 C t (e; ) and all t < j t (e; ) 1 2 < i (e; ) for all candidate j 2 C (e; ) , j 6 = i for some 2 f1; 2; :::; cg. Notice that u m (x i ) < u m (x j ) and x i < x j imply u`(x i ) < u`(x j ) for all citizen`with ideal policy x` m. It follows that these citizens must be ranking candidate j above candidate i. This implies that candidate i cannot receive majority support before all candidate h with x h x j is eliminated. Let t (< ) be the elimination round at which the last active candidate at x j is eliminated. (If need be, relabel the candidates such that this candidate is candidate j.) Since only a leftmost or a rightmost candidate is eliminated, it must then be that at elimination round t candidate j is the (unique) rightmost active candidate. Pick an active candidate h with ideal policy x h < x j and who is the closest active neighbor of candidate j. Notice that u`(x j ) > u`(x h ) for all citizen`with x`> x h +xj 2 . Since candidate j is the rightmost active candidate at elimination round t, all these citizens must be ranking candidate j …rst. It follows that candidate j's support at round t is such that . Notice that x h < x j m implies We are now ready to establish that when the election is held under Coombs Voting with only completely-…lled ballots admissible, all equilibria are one-position serious equilibria. Let (e; ) be an equilibrium. Given Claim 5.1, it must be that u m (x i ) = u m (x j ) > u m (x k ) for all candidates i and j in W (e; ) and all candidate k = 2 W (e; ). There are two cases to consider.
1. x i = x j for all candidates i and j in W (e; ). It must then be that (e; ) is a one-position serious equilibrium. This is because otherwise there would be a candidate h with x h 6 = x i whose defection would leave the winning lottery unchanged. Such a candidate h would therefore be better o¤ defecting and saving on the candidacy cost, which would contradict that (e; ) is an equilibrium. It follows that x i = x j for all candidates i and j. If there is more than one candidate, then one of them would also be better o¤ defecting and saving on the candidacy cost, which would contradict that (e; ) is an equilibrium. Thus, C (e) = fig. 2. x i < x j for some candidates i and j in W (e; ). Given Claim 5.1, it must be that x i < m < x j and u m (x i ) = u m (x j ). Moreover, there is no candidate h with ideal policy x h 2 (x i ; x j ). Notice that candidate i's expected utility is given by U i (e; ) = (1 p) u i (x j ) , where p denotes the probability that x i is implemented. For candidate i to not be willing to defect, it must be that U i (e; ) > u i (x j ), which implies p u (jx i x j j) > . Proceeding likewise for candidate j, we get (1 p) u (jx i x j j) > . Taken together, these two inequalities imply u(jxi xj j) 2 > . Since (e; ) is an equilibrium, it must be that no other citizen would be better o¤ entering the race. Pick a citizen h = 2 C (e) with x h 2 (x i ; x j ). Notice that her expected utility is given by U h (e; ) = pu h (x i ) + (1 p) u h (x j ). Consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 1 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. Taken together, x i < m < x j and x h 2 (x i ; x j ) imply u m (x h ) > u m (x k ) for all candidate k 2 C (e e). It then follows from Claim 5.1 that W (e e; ) = fhg. Citizen h's expected utility is therefore given by U h (e e; ) = . For citizen h to not be willing to enter the race, it must be that U h (e; ) U h (e e; ). Notice that this argument must hold for all citizen h with x h 2 (x i ; x j ). Without loss of generality suppose that p 1=2 and write citizen h's ideal policy as x h = (x i + ") for " > 0. Letting " go toward zero, we get
[U h (e; ) U h (e e; )] 0 , u (jx i x j j) 2 .
Taken together, the two inequalities above imply u(jxi xj j) 2 > u(jxi xj j) 2 , which yields a contradiction. Hence, there cannot be an equilibrium with several winning positions. This completes the proof since these two cases exhaust all possibilities. Suppose now that the election is held under the Single Transferable Vote and that only completely-…lled ballots are admissible. To prove the result stated in Proposition 5, it is su¢ cient to construct a two-position serious equilibrium (that will necessarily be extreme compared to all one-position serious equilibria). In order to save on space, this straightforward exercise is left to the reader. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. To prove part (1) of the statement, it is su¢ cient to establish that the set of relatively sincere equilibria is equivalent to the set of one-position serious equilibria.
I start by ruling out the existence of relatively sincere two-position serious equilibria.
Claim 6.1. Suppose that the election is held under Bucklin Voting and that truncated ballots are admissible. Then, no relatively sincere two-position serious equilibrium exists.k Proof of Claim 6.1. Assume by way of contradiction that (e; ) is a relatively sincere two-position serious equilibrium with policy outcome fx L ; x R g, x L < x R .
I start by establishing that u m (x L ) = u m (x R ). Assume by way of contradiction that u m (x L ) > u m (x R ). (The argument is similar if one assumes u m (x L ) < u m (x R ).) This implies that m <
. Since there are only two candidates' positions, the voting pro…le (e) must be such that for all citizen`,
Let k t (e; ) be the mass of votes that candidate k receives at the t th vote count, for t = 1; 2; :::; c. Given the voting pro…le (e), candidates'vote totals at the last vote count are given by Since (e; ) is an equilibrium, it must be that neither of the candidates would be better o¤ defecting. Pick a candidate i with x i = x L , and notice that his expected utility is given by U i (e; ) = c R c u L (x R ) . Consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e i = 0 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = i. Since there are at most two candidates'positions and that u m (x L ) = u m (x R ), it is easy to check that the voting pro…le (e e) must be such that W (e e; ) = C (e e). It follows that candidate i's expected utility is now given by U i (e e; ) = c R c 1 u L (x R ). For candidate i to not be willing to defect, it must be that U i (e; ) > U i (e e; ) or, equivalently, that
Since (e; ) is an equilibrium, it must be that no other citizen would be better o¤ entering the race. Pick a citizen h = 2 C (e) with x h 2 (x L ; x R ). Notice that her expected utility is given by U h (e; ) =
. Consider the candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 1 and e e k = e k for all k 6 = h. Suppose that x h A (e e; ), where A (e e; ) denotes the expected winning policy. (We shall see below that this assumption is without loss of generality.) Given the concavity of u (:), we then have u`(x h ) U`(e e; ) for all citizen`with ideal policy x` x h . Relative sincerity then implies that all these citizens must be voting for candidate h. Moreover, h 2 G`(C (e e)) for all citizen`with x`2 x h ;
, which implies that all these citizens must be ranking h …rst on their ballot. Citizen h's vote total at the last vote count is therefore such that > m. Notice that u m (x L ) = u m (x R ) and the fact that x L (x R , resp.) is the leftmost (rightmost, resp.) candidates'position imply that C L (e e) L`(C (e e)) for all citizeǹ with x` m. It follows that neither of these citizens must be voting for a candidate at x L . By the same argument, we can establish that C R (e e) L`(C (e e)) for all citizen`with x` m and, therefore, that neither of these citizens must For all candidacy pro…le e e where e e h = 1 and e e k = e k for some h 6 = i and all k 6 = h, let the voting pro…le b (e e) = (e e). Since there are only two candidates in C (e e), the voting pro…le (e e) -and, therefore, b (e e) -is necessarily relatively sincere. Finally, for all other candidacy pro…le e, let b (e) be any relatively sincere voting pro…le. Hence, (b e; b ) is a relatively sincere serious equilibrium that is equivalent to (e; ).
To prove part (2) of Proposition 6, it is su¢ cient to construct a spoiler equilibrium that is extreme compared to all PV equilibria. To save on space, such an example is omitted here. (It is available from the author upon request.) Q.E.D.
